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INTRODUCTION
The interpretation and application of tax treaties raise unique and
difficult issues of law.' Tax treaties are generally-worded, 2 bilateral
1. Although a few people have given this subject serious thought, scholarly attention
in the United States and the United Kingdom has been minimal. See Rosenbloom, Tax
Treaty Interpretation, 34 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENT'N 543 (1980); Brockway,
Override of Tax Treaties by Ordinary Legislation, 34 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL Docu-
MENT'N 553 (1980) (United States); Lidstone, Liberal Construction of Tax Treaties-An
Analysis of Congressional and Administrative Limitations of an Old Doctrine, 47 CORNELL
L.Q. 529 (1962) (United States); Wang, International Double Taxation of Income: Relief
Through International Agreement 1921-1945, 59 HARV. L. REv. 73 (1945). In the case of
Canada, the literature is more extensive. However, this literature tends merely to state the
customary canons of interpretation rather than to evaluate them. See Boidman, Interpreta-
tion of Tax Treaties in Canada, 34 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENT'N 388 (1980);
Ward, Principles to be Applied in Interpreting Tax Treaties, 25 CAN. TAX J. 263 (1977)
(Canada and international principles) [hereinafter cited as Ward I]; Ward, Principles to be
Applied in Interpreting Tax Treaties, 34 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENT'N 545
(1980) (update of 1977 article) [hereinafter cited as Ward II].
2. Although tax treaties are generally-worded, there is a clear tendency in recent
agreements between developed nations to tie a treaty's provisions closely to features of
domestic tax law. A prime example of this is the 1975 United States-United Kingdom
Convention, which attempts to fix the interrelationship among (1) the British system of
partial corporate-shareholder taxation integration, (2) the operation of indirect foreign tax
credits in connection with the deemed or actual payment of a dividend from a British
corporation to a United States corporate shareholder, and (3) the proper level of taxation of
the dividend from a British corporation to a United States shareholder. See Convention
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Dec. 31, 1975, United States-United Kingdom, arts.
10, 23, 31 U.S.T. 5668, 5677-79, 5685-87, T.I.A.S. No. 9682, at 10-12, 18-20, amended by
Additional Protocol, Aug. 26, 1976, art. III, 31 U.S.T. 5668, 5705-06, T.I.A.S. No. 9682, at
38-39 (amending art. 23), amended by Additional Protocol, Mar. 15, 1979, arts. III, V, 31
U.S.T. 5668, 5710-11, T.I.A.S. No. 9682, at 43-44 (amending arts. 10, 23) [hereinafter cited
as 1975 United States-United Kingdom Convention].
Even though these treaty provisions are related specifically to the provisions of the
underlying revenue laws, problems of interpretation still arise. For example, in Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 8239019 (June 25, 1982) (available on LEXIS, Fedtax library, PR file), the IRS was
asked to interpret Article 23(1) of the Convention, which provides that a U.S. corporation
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instruments that rest on complex revenue legislation. The treaties
modify, restrict, and elaborate the operation of the underlying revenue
laws without radically altering them. The generality of treaty lan-
guage presents special interpretation problems in view of the detail in
the underlying statutes.
The bilaterality of tax treaties complicates their application in
three ways. First, treaty language is designed to produce similar
results in what may be two very different revenue systems. Second,
the legal role of treaties may be different in the two signatory nations.
Third, the same treaty language will be interpreted in two separate
court systems without any guarantee of harmonious results.
Treaties also do not represent the sole or even the major form of
dual-jurisdiction tax harmonization. Unilateral methods, such as the
foreign tax credit,3 still provide a basis in the absence of, or within, a
treaty for allocating jurisdiction over and revenue attributable to a
person or entity with multination contacts.
described in Article 10(2)(a)(i) is entitled to a credit, in accordance with U.S. law, for taxes
paid to the United Kingdom. I.R.C. § 902(c)(1) (1982) provides that, for purposes of
determining the amount of tax on dividends, dividends paid within the first 60 days of any
year may be attributed to the accumulated profits of the preceding years. Relying on § 902,
the U.S. parent of a U.K. subsidiary arranged to have a dividend paid within the first 60
days of 1980 and treated the dividend as having been paid from the subsidiary's accumu-
lated profits from the preceding years. The IRS ruled, however, that the U.S. parent was
not entitled to apply § 902(c)(1) to dividends described in Article 23(1) of the Convention.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8239019, supra. See also Rosenbloom, supra note 1, at 544 (discussing the
1975 United States-United Kingdom Convention, supra, in relation to the British advance
corporation tax).
3. Sections 901 to 905 of the Internal Revenue Code provide unilateral double taxa-
tion relief for U.S. citizens and residents, including U.S. corporations. I.R.C. §§ 901-905
(West 1982 & Supp. 1985). In general, relief is provided only with respect to taxes on
income sourced in another country or, in the case of I.R.C. § 902, on income earned by a
foreign corporation and then distributed as a dividend to a U.S. corporate shareholder that
owns 10% or more of the foreign corporation's stock. Relief is limited in each year by
I.R.C. § 904 to the amount of taxes that the United States would have imposed on the
foreign income. Thus, taxes imposed by a foreign nation at a higher rate than U.S. taxation
of the same income cannot be applied against U.S. liability on U.S. source income. By
virtue of I.R.C. §§ 901 and 903, the only taxes that are creditable are income, war profits,
and excess profits taxes, along with certain taxes imposed in lieu of such taxes.
Section 906 provides unilateral relief to nonresident alien individuals and foreign corpo-
rations that are not covered by a treaty. I.R.C. § 906 (West 1982 & Supp. 1985). This
provision admits foreigners to the benefits provided for citizens and residents under I.R-C.
§ 901, but only in the case of income that is effectively connected with a trade or business
within the United States. Thus, a foreigner paying the 30% tax on periodical income that
is not effectively connected cannot get a U.S. credit but must look to his home country for
relief. For a thorough discussion of many aspects of the operation of these various credit
provisions, see Dale, The Reformed Foreign Tax Credit: A Path Through the Maze, 33 TAx
L. REV. 175 (1978); Gann, The Concept of an Independent Treaty Foreign Tax Credit, 38
TAX L. REv. 1 (1982); Isenbergh, The Foreign Tax Credit: Royalties, Subsidies, and Cred-
itable Taxes, 39 TAx L. REv. 227 (1984).
Canada and the United Kingdom maintain analogous, although not perfectly identical,
foreign tax credit regimes. See 3 CAN. TAX REP. (CCH) 19,700-19,792 (1985); F
SIMON's TAXEs §§ F1.117-151 (rev. 3d ed. 1983) (United Kingdom).
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The purpose of this Article is not to propose a departure either
from the current structure or language of tax treaties or from their
bilateral format. Nor does this Article address the desirability of using
model treaties,4 such as the United Nations or OECD models.5
Instead, the purpose here is to look at the interpretation and applica-
tion of treaties in Canada, the United States, and the United King-
dom 6 in order to explore the range and substance of treaty application
in those countries. The three leading developed common law jurisdic-
tions are obviously not a random or representative sample of coun-
tries. The three countries were chosen because they conduct a large
amount of trade with each other7 and have similar legal systems. In
addition, these countries have the most highly developed set of cases
and rulings interpreting and applying treaties. Finally, as will be seen
below, the available decisional material frequently involves treaties
with other countries, such as Sri Lanka, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, or Poland.8 Therefore, the findings of this Article are relevant
to non-common law countries.
The investigation of the cases and materials in these three coun-
tries shows that courts and revenue authorities of the country in which
income is sourced9 normally interpret tax treaties so as to apply their
4. Model treaties are forms developed by various organizations to guide treaty negoti-
ators. For example, there is an OECD model income tax treaty, a U.N. model, and a
United States Treasury Department model. However, the treaties that are actually negoti-
ated frequently differ from all of these models. For example, both the Convention with
Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Sept. 26, 1980, United States-Canada, S.
ExEc. Doc. T, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in 4 CAN. TAX REP. (CCH) 1 30,224
(1984) [hereinafter cited as 1980 United States-Canada Convention] and the 1975 United
States-United Kingdom Convention, supra note 2, reflect the peculiarly strong economic
ties and interests of the signatories. See infra note 7.
5. For a recent discussion of these issues, see Whittaker, An Examination of the
O.E.C.D. and UN. Model Tax Treaties: History, Provisions and Application to U.S. Foreign
Policy, 8 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 39 (1982). For a thorough treatment of the current
U.S. models, their genesis, and their relationship to the OECD models, see Rosenbloom,
Current Developments in Regard to Tax Treaties, in 40TH ANNUAL N.Y.U. INSTITUTE ON
FEDERAL TAXATION § 31.04 (1982).
6. Treaties are reprinted in national treaty series and the United Nations Treaty
Series. In addition, U.S. treaties can be found in the CCH Tax Treaties service, Canadian
treaties in the CCH Canadian Tax Reporter service, and U.K. treaties in volume F of
Simon's Taxes.
7. In 1983, the total value of U.S. exports was $200.5 billion. Exports to Canada were
$38.2 billion and to the United Kingdom $10.6 billion. In the same year, the total value of
Canadian exports was $76.7 billion. Exports to the U.S. were $53.8 billion and to the
United Kingdom $2.0 billion. United Kingdom exports in 1983 totalled $91.6 billion.
Exports to the U.S. were $12.7 billion and to Canada $1.4 billion. INT'L MONETARY
FUND, DIRECTION OF TRADE STATISTICS, 1984 YEARBOOK 113, 382, 385 (1984) (all
figures in U.S. dollars).
8. See infra notes 92-99, 113-26, 184-92 and accompanying text.
9. The "source country" is the country in which income is deemed to have arisen.
For example, a sale of an interest in real estate, located in the United States, is deemed to be
"income from sources within the United States" without regard to the location of the
owner or other facts. I.R.C. § 861(a)(5) (1982).
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country's tax rules' ° that would apply in the absence of a treaty. Trea-
ties can alter source jurisdiction treatment, but this is not their main
thrust. Nor do treaties reach for an international revenue accommo-
dation. Rather, tax treaties are limited cessions of the fundamental
notion of source jurisdiction sovereignty.
II
TAX TREATIES IN GENERAL
Any effort to describe the contents of a "typical" tax treaty con-
fronts the fact that some treaties are quite old and differ substantially
from recent treaties, including current model treaties. Even among
more recent treaties, there are numerous variations of style and sub-
stance, reflecting history, ideology, and the particular treaty model
that is followed. Nevertheless, there is general uniformity among most
treaties regarding the major facets of design. First, tax treaties sepa-
rate business from investment income. The source country may tax
the business income of an individual or enterprise of the other signa-
tory country only if that individual or enterprise has a permanent
establishment within the source country."! Thus, business income
earned in the absence of a permanent establishment will not be taxed,
even though it is earned within the source country.' 2 Second, certain
types of investment income are treated separately even if there is a
permanent establishment, as long as they are not effectively connected
with that permanent establishment.' 3 This income is usually taxed at
lower rates than would apply to nonresident aliens of a nontreaty
country. Third, the treaties resolve various jurisdictional issues. For
example, a particular tax may be deemed to be creditable under a sig-
natory's foreign tax credit regime,' 4 or real property income might be
10. See infra note 178 for a discussion of the different tax rules that may apply.
11. See, eg., 1975 United States-United Kingdom Convention, supra note 2, at art. 7(1)
(referring to "business profits," a new term for the concept of "industrial and commercial
profits" used in older treaties). Dividends and interest are also taxed as business profits if
they are "effectively connected with a permanent establishment." See id at arts. 10(5),
11(6).
A permanent establishment is usually defined by treaty as a permanent business presence
in a non-domiciliary country. See, e.g., id. at art. 5. The concept has attracted considerable
judicial and scholarly attention. For example, in Masri v. Minister of Nat'l Revenue, 73 D.
Tax 5367 (Fed. Ct. Can. Tr. Div. 1973), the Trial Division of the Federal Court of Canada
held that a U.S. resident who was an inactive partner in a partnership with substantial real
estate investments in Canada but no other significant Canadian contacts was not involved
in a permanent establishment there within the meaning of the 1942 United States-Canada
Convention. See generally Williams, Permanent Establishments in the United States, 29
TAX LAW. 277 (1976).
12. See, eg., 1980 United States-Canada Convention, supra note 4, at art. VII(l).
13. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. Interest, dividends, royalties, capital
gains, and rents are the most common types of such investment income.
14. See, e.g., 1975 United States-United Kingdom Convention, supra note 2, at art.
2(2)(b) (British petroleum tax eligible for a U.S. foreign tax credit). This provision negates
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subjected to full taxation in the situs country, even in the absence of a
permanent establishment.15 Fourth, certain persons and industries,
such as visiting scholars, 16 airline and shipping companies, 17 and per-
forming artists,18 are accorded special treatment. Fifth, the two
nations establish mutual agreement and accommodation procedures
for resolving conflicts concerning the application of the treaty.19
Sixth, the countries agree to exchange information.20 Seventh, each
country reserves the right to tax its residents or nationals as though
the treaty had not come into effect.21
Tax treaties have been called "conventions for the avoidance of
Rev. Rul. 78-424, 1978-2 C.B. 197, which held that the British tax did not qualify for a
U.S. foreign tax credit.
15. This does not mean that the situs country must tax real property income or that the
residence country may not also tax real property income after providing a foreign tax
credit. Rather, the situs country may tax the income even in the absence of a permanent
establishment. See, e.g., 1975 United States-United Kingdom Convention, supra note 2, at
art. 6; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Sept. 8, 1978, Canada-United
Kingdom, art. VI, 1980 Can. T.S. No. 25, reprinted in 4 CAN. TAx. REP. (CCH) 1 30,231
(1979) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Canada-United Kingdom Convention]. The Canadian
Parliament adopted the 1978 Canada-United Kingdom Convention, together with certain
precatory provisions, as the Canada-United Kingdom Income Tax Convention Act, 1980,
ch. 44, pt. X, 1980-1983 Can. Stat. 899, 906.
16. See, e.g., 1975 United States-United Kingdom Convention, supra note 2, at arts. 20,
21.
17. See, e.g., id at art. 8; 1978 Canada-United Kingdom Convention, supra note 15, at
art. VIII.
18. See, e.g., 1975 United States-United Kingdom Convention, supra note 2, at art. 17;
1978 Canada-United Kingdom Convention, supra note 15, at art. XVI.
19. See, e.g., 1975 United States-United Kingdom Convention, supra note 2, at art. 25;
1978 Canada-United Kingdom Convention, supra note 15, at art. XXIII.
20. See, e.g., 1975 United States-United Kingdom Convention, supra note 2, at art. 26;
1978 Canada-United Kingdom Convention, supra note 15, at art. XXIV. For a brief dis-
cussion of the kinds of information that are exchanged pursuant to tax treaties, see
Seemann, Exchange of Information under International Tax Conventions, 17 INT'L LAW.
333 (1983).
21. See, e.g., 1975 United States-United Kingdom Convention, supra note 2, at art.
1(3). Thus, tax treaties are primarily relied upon by persons who are not citizens or resi-
dents of the forum jurisdiction. An exception arises when taxpayers use tax treaties to
calculate the amount of their foreign tax credit. See infra notes 195-98 and accompanying
text.
The language of saving clauses varies from treaty to treaty. For example, Article 1(3) of
the 1975 United States-United Kingdom Convention, supra note 2, provides, "Notwith-
standing any provision of this Convention except paragraph (4) of this Article, a Con-
tracting State may tax its residents . . . and its nationals as if this Convention had not
come into effect." Paragraph 4 contains several specific exceptions. Id.
Rev. Rul. 79-28, 1979-1 C.B. 457 interpreted the saving clause in the Convention for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation, Mar. 8, 1971, United States-Japan, art. 4, 23 U.S.T. 967,
973-75, T.I.A.S. No. 7365, at 7-9, to permit Japan to tax fully the income of a U.S. citizen
flight crew member earned while serving on a Japanese airline, even with respect to service
performed within the United States. Thus, the Convention was interpreted to cede source
jurisdiction taxation over income earned by a national of the source country. This is per-
haps the least common kind of cession of jurisdiction. There was, however, clear language
in the Convention to support this interpretation. Article 5(1)(a) of the Convention incorpo-
rated a special source rule from Article 6 that covered this taxpayer's situation. This Arti-
cle was explicitly excepted from the Convention's saving clause by Article 4(4)(a).
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double taxation. ' 22 Virtually all treaties have an article entitled
"Elimination of Double Taxation. '23 This article frequently adapts the
application of foreign tax credit regimes of the signatories. 24 In addi-
tion, most mutual agreement articles have as a residual basis for a
mutual agreement "the elimination of double taxation in cases not
provided for in the Convention." 25
Most treaties, in fact, eliminate very little double taxation.
Because many countries have adopted elaborate foreign tax credit
regimes, the primary purpose of modem treaties is not to prevent
double taxation. Rather, these treaties provide for the source coun-
try's cession of taxing jurisdiction and revenue to the residence nation
in the situations the treaty enumerates.26 In addition, the treaties cre-
ate a tailored interface between the two tax systems and otherwise
resolve debatable issues under domestic nontreaty revenue law.
III
THE METHODS OF ADOPTING TAX TREATIES
Despite the great similarity among tax treaties, one might sup-
pose that they would be construed differently in the various nations.
One reason for differences in construction may be that tax treaties
become authoritative legal instruments in Canada, the United States,
and the United Kingdom by different methods. These different meth-
ods of adoption reflect constitutional differences among the three
countries.
A. CANADA
Canada is a federal, parliamentary democracy operating under a
newly repatriated constitution. 27 While the British monarch remains
22. See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Dec. 3, 1971, United
States-Norway, 23 U.S.T. 2832, T.I.A.S. No. 7474.
23. See, eg., 1980 United States-Canada Convention, supra note 4, at art. XXIV.
24. For example, Articles 10 and 23 of the 1975 United States-United Kingdom Con-
vention, supra note 2, fit the United Kingdom's advance corporation tax (ACT) into the
structure of the U.S. foreign tax credit provisions without otherwise altering the U.S. law.
Without the Convention's accommodation of the ACT, it would be unclear whether share-
holders or corporations could claim payment of the tax as a foreign tax credit because of
the ACT's dual shareholder and corporate character. The ACT was first imposed by the
Finance Act, 1972, ch. 41, §§ 84-111.
25. See, eg., 1980 United States-Canada Convention, supra note 4, at art. XXVI(3).
26. The United States' views concerning the primary purposes of modern treaties are
discussed in Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at § 31.04, at 31-56 to 31-57.
27. Prior to its recent patriation, the Canadian constitution existed as a United King-
dom statute, the British North America Act, 1867, 30 Vict., ch. 3, together with amend-
ments, a few significant royal orders, and a few less significant British statutes. In
December, 1981, the parliament of Canada adopted the Constitution Act, 1982, which
contains the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as well as a list of British statutes
and royal orders deemed to survive the adoption of the Constitution Act. See 1980-1983
1984]
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the head of state,28 the country is in all other respects fully sovereign.
In Canada, as in the United States and the United Kingdom, the first
step in the generation of a tax treaty is negotiation with a potential
treaty partner.2 9
Once a treaty is negotiated, the Canadian government submits it
to the House of Commons and Senate for enactment. This is normally
a pro forma matter in Canada's parliamentary system. The Canadian
parliament enacts a treaty by incorporating it into a statutory instru-
ment that also includes a title, an effective date, and words of effectua-
tion.30 Thus, Canadian courts treat tax treaties as statutes.31 In
addition, these treaties have some quality of bindingness on Canada as
Can. Stat. iii. In order to effectuate fully Canada's adoption of the Constitution Act, the
British Parliament also adopted it as the Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11. Section 2 of the Can-
ada Act broke Canada's bond with Parliament: "No Act of the Parliament of the United
Kingdom passed after the Constitution Act, 1982, comes into force shall extend to Canada
as part of its law." The Queen proclaimed the Constitution Act, 1982, to be in force on
April 17, 1982. III Can. Gaz. 33-34 (sp. issue Sept. 21, 1982).
28. See Constitution Act, 1982, § 41(a), 1980-1983 Can. Stat. at xv-xvi (procedure for
amendments to the Constitution that affect "the office of the Queen").
29. Canada has signed tax treaties with over 40 nations. See 4 CAN. TAX REP. (CCH)
30,000, passim (1984).
30. For an example of words of effectuation, see infra text accompanying note 118.
31. There is substantial British and Canadian authority for the proposition that, except
for peace treaties, a treaty does not become part of the municipal law of either nation
without statutory action. See Francis v. The Queen, 3 D.L.R.2d 641 (Can. 1956). Chief
Justice Kerwin, writing for three justices, stated,
The Jay Treaty was not a treaty of peace and it is clear that in Canada such
rights and privileges as are here advanced of subjects of a contracting party to a
treaty are enforceable by the Courts only where the treaty has been implemented
or sanctioned by legislation. This. . . is justified by a continuous line of authority
in England.. . . It has been held that no rights under a treaty of cession can be
enforced in the Courts except in so far as they have been incorporated in municipal
law ....
Id at 643 (citations omitted). Justice Rand, writing for two justices, explained,
Except as to diplomatic status and certain immunities and to belligerent rights,
treaty provisions affecting matters within the scope of municipal law, that is, which
purport to change existing law or restrict the future action of the Legislature,
including, under our Constitution, the participation of the Crown, and in the
absence of a constitutional provision declaring the treaty itself to be law of the
state, as in the United States, must be supplemented by statutory action.
Id at 647.
Recent litigation concerning the Panama Canal Treaty, Sept. 7, 1977, United States-
Panama, - U.S.T. _ T.I.A.S. No. 10030, has addressed the effect under international and
domestic law of executive agreements that implement a treaty. See Coplin v. United States,
6 Cl. Ct. 115 (1984). In that case, a U.S. citizen argued that Article XV(2) of the Agree-
ment in Implementation of Article III of the Panama Canal Treaty, Sept. 7, 1977, United
States-Panama, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 10031, at 40, which provides that U.S. citizens
who are employees of the Panama Canal Commission "shall be exempt from any taxes...
as a result of their work for the Commission," provided exemption from U.S. as well as
Panamanian taxes. This Agreement was not submitted to the Senate for its advice and
consent. 6 Cl. Ct. at 120. The United States argued, inter alia, that the Agreement lacked
domestic effect because it was not ratified. Id. The Claims Court agreed with the taxpayer
on the basis of several theories, including the theory that this executive agreement was a
treaty within the meaning of I.R.C. § 894(a) (1982). See 6. Cl. Ct. at 124-25.
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a nation subject to international law.32
B. THE UNITED STATES
The United States generates a treaty by a process of negotiation
similar to Canada's. However, unlike Canadian practice, once the
treaty and an authoritative explanation of its terms are drafted, the
President submits the treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent. 33
The Senate usually consents, and the treaty then goes into effect pursu-
ant to an instrument of ratification signed by the President, the Secre-
tary of State, or, more frequently, a lower-level diplomat.3 4 Thus, in
the United States, the treaty is an executive agreement that is reviewed
by one legislative house but is not enacted as a statute. The final steps
in implementation are an exchange of instruments of ratification fol-
lowed by an official proclamation of the treaty by the President.35
Occasionally, as in the case of the 1975 United States-United
Kingdom Convention,36 the Senate consents to a proposed treaty with
reservations or declines to consent unless certain provisions are
stricken or renegotiated by way of an amendatory protocol. 37 Thus,
even though the formal role of the Senate is less significant than the
roles of the British and Canadian parliaments, the Senate has, in fact,
been more active than the others in reviewing and considering the sub-
stance of proposed treaties.
Although U.S. treaties are not statutes, they have equal dignity
with statutes under the Constitution. 38 Therefore, the Internal Reve-
nue Code must make allowance for tax treaties. Section 7852(d) of the
32. The status of tax treaties under international law is murky at best. See infra notes
76-77 and accompanying text. No treaty provides that a dispute can or must be brought
before an international tribunal, such as the International Court of Justice. In addition,
except for some evidence that tax treaty disputes are occasionally submitted to consensual
arbitration, there is no case law or other authority concerning what happens when parties
to a tax treaty become embroiled in an intractable dispute. However, there is nothing in a
tax treaty to suggest that it is not subject to the various international conventions and
norms governing other treaties.
33. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
34. See, eg., Protocol To Amend Tax Convention, Nov. 24, 1978, United States-
France, 30 U.S.T. 5109, T.I.A.S. No. 9500 (signed by Acting Secretary of State); see Rosen-
bloom, supra note 5, at § 31.03[5] n.141.
35. See Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at § 31.02[2].
36. 1975 United States-United Kingdom Convention, supra note 2.
37. See Comment, America Waves the Rules While Britannia Rules the Waves, 1983
BRIT. TAX REv. 265, 265.
38. The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution makes treaties and federal laws,
along with the Constitution, the supreme law of the land. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
This implies that treaties and statutes are equal, at least in regard to domestic effects. Thus,
in the Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884), the Court held that a new federal statutory
head tax on immigrants was enforceable despite existing treaty provisions that prohibited
imposition of such taxes. See Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310 (1914); 2 C. HYDE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 529 (2d ed. 1945).
1984]
264 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:255
Code39 was enacted at the time of the recodification of the revenue
laws in 1954 to ensure that the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 would
not abrogate treaties that were in effect or nullify any of their provi-
sions.4° This provision is now of limited and diminishing significance.
Of greater importance are the rules contained in I.R.C. section 894.41
Section 894(a) establishes the supremacy of treaty exemption lan-
guage: "Income of any kind, to the extent required by any treaty obli-
gation of the United States, shall not be included in gross income and
shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle."' 42 Section 894(b),
by contrast, serves the limited function of negating the "force of
attraction" principle,43 which was contained in most treaties negoti-
ated prior to the adoption of the Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966. 44
That Act replaced the force of attraction feature of domestic law with
the "effectively connected" concept. 45 In most instances, this change
reduced United States taxation of nonresident alien individuals and
foreign corporations. However, in cases in which the change is not
beneficial to a treaty national and is contrary to the treaty, the change
does not apply.46
C. THE UNITED KINGDOM
The British method of adopting a treaty differs from Canadian
and U.S. methods. Under the Income and Corporation Taxes Act,
1970,47 a draft treaty negotiated by the government is laid before the
39. I.R.C. § 7852(d) (1982).
40. See P. McDANIEL & H. AULT, INTRODUCTION TO UNITED STATES INTERNA-
TIONAL TAXATION 168 (2d ed. 1981).
41. I.R.C. § 894 (1982).
42. I.R.C. § 894(a). See Langer, Override of Tax Treaties by Ordinary Legislation, 34
BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENT'N 552, 553 (1980). The less basic and perhaps unin-
tended consequences of this provision's narrowness will be explored later in this Article.
For additional discussion of I.R.C. § 894(a), see infra notes 78-91 and accompanying text.
43. The force of attraction principle provided that when a nonresident alien individual
or a foreign corporation was engaged in a U.S. trade or business, all of his or its U.S. source
income was taxed as income attributable to that trade or business. This meant that unre-
lated passive investment income was lumped together with business income and taxed at
graduated rates rather than pursuant to the fixed withholding tax rates of 30% or less. See
P. MCDANIEL & H. AULT, supra note 40, at 54-55.
44. Pub. L. No. 89-809, tit. I, 80 Stat. 1539, 1541 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of I.R.C. (1982)).
45. See see. 104(b), § 882, 80 Stat. at 1555-57. Income is "effectively connected" if it is
attributable to the U.S. trade or business. The effectively connected rules include a residual
force of attraction rule. See infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
46. Section 110 of the Act provides,
No amendment made by this title shall apply in any case where its application
would be contrary to any treaty obligation of the United States. For purposes of
the preceding sentence, the extension of a benefit provided by any amendment
made by this title shall not be deemed to be contrary to a treaty obligation of the
United States.
Pub. L. No. 89-809, sec. 110, 80 Stat. at 1575.
47. Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1970, ch. 10.
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House of Commons. 48 The House of Commons prays the Queen by
Address to put the treaty in effect by Order in the Privy Council.49
The Queen may revoke a declaration in a subsequent Order of the
Privy Council.50 Because of the formal quality of Parliamentary and
royal consideration, a British treaty becomes law by virtue of its status
as an executive agreement.
IV
TREATY INTERPRETATION
A. INTERPRETATION BY TAXPAYERS
The most frequent occasion for tax treaty interpretation is private
interpretation by taxpayers and their advisors.5 ' Generally, a taxpayer
who is a citizen or resident of one contracting state employs a treaty in
order to determine the proper treatment of income he derived in the
other contracting state. Such a person may also use the treaty indi-
rectly to determine liability to his home state when calculating the
amount of his foreign tax credit. 52
B. INTERPRETATION IN MUTUAL AGREEMENT PROCEEDINGS
Treaty interpretation also occurs pursuant to a "mutual agree-
ment" or "competent authority" procedure. 53 Treaties typically pro-
48. Id. at § 497(8).
49. Id. See generally Oliver, Double Tax Treaties in United Kingdom Tax Law, 1970
BRIT. TAx REv. 388.
50. Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1970, ch. 10, § 497(7).
51. This is clearly so in Canada and the United States. Because the United Kingdom
does not operate on a self-assessment system, official scrutiny of treaty questions is more
likely to occur in that country.
52. See infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
53. See Rev. Proc. 82-29, 1982-1 C.B. 481 (competent authority procedure with respect
to "allocation of income and deductions"); Rev. Proc. 77-16, 1977-1 C.B. 573 (competent
authority procedure for matters other than "allocation of income and deductions," such as
"the availability to a United States taxpayer of credits against foreign tax, exemptions from
foreign tax, reduced rates of foreign tax, and other benefits and safeguards").
In a brief, thoughtful comment on other papers, David Rosenbloom has taken the posi-
tion that competent authority interpretation of treaty language should perhaps be more
aggressive than, or at least as aggressive as, judicial interpretation.
I feel strongly. . . that the competent authority is more than simply exercising a
mechanical function sitting there with, in one hand, the treaty and, in the other
hand, the Internal Revenue Code, maybe a dictionary, and spinning forth answers
to what words mean ...
E . . [O]ne view which I share is that the competent authority has the right and
duty to take account of all my primary materials, and that, yes, present policies,
present models, any available evidence that will help, can be relied upon legiti-
mately by the competent authority in resolving particular double taxation
problems that come up under a treaty.
Rosenbloom, supra note 1, at 545. Not surprisingly, Rosenbloom, then a Treasury official,
argued that the notes of the negotiators are more reliable materials to interpret a treaty
than Senate ratification reports. Id at 544.
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vide that, under certain circumstances, the revenue authorities of the
two signatories may agree on the application of the treaty to a particu-
lar case or on a general matter of treaty interpretation. The requisite
circumstances vary from treaty to treaty but generally include double
taxation or other inconsistent treatment.5 4 Some older treaties suggest
that the home state must receive a "claim,"155 but modem treaties pro-
vide only that there may be a mutual agreement.
At least one group of commentators has suggested that mutual
agreements may operate in some instances to amend the provisions of
a treaty,5 6 but this is highly debatable in the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Canada.5 7 It is widely thought that the Department of
the Treasury, which is the competent authority in the United States,
may not act in a legislative manner.58 However, a former Treasury
official, Mr. David Rosenbloom, has argued that the Treasury should
be given very broad latitude in mutual agreement proceedings.
[T]he competent authorities must have leeway to resolve cases of double taxa-
tion in a practical way. Since it is not imaginable that treaty partners will
invariably accept U.S. positions on all issues, the U.S. competent authority
must have room to negotiate, both in regard to facts and, to some extent, in
regard to principle. . . .Although there are doubtless cases where a proposed
resolution would exceed any reasonable mandate, a strict interpretation of the
competent authority function could deprive tax treaties of a considerable part
of their utility.5 9
54. But see Rev. Rul. 54-53, 1954-1 C.B. 156 (the mutual agreement procedure of the
United States-Sweden treaty cannot be employed to ameliorate a harsh inconsistency in the
treatment of alimony by the two nations). The Ruling holds that there is no relief for a
Swedish resident receiving alimony from a U.S. alimony trust when each nation takes the
position that it is taxable income. The Ruling concludes, "However, [the mutual agree-
ment] article does not refer to a case where the reason for the double taxation of income is
due to the differences in the systems of taxation in the two countries." Id.
55. See Rev. Rul. 56-251, 1956-1 C.B. 846 (interpreting the Estate Tax Convention,
Oct. 18, 1946, United States-France, 64 Stat. 133, T.I.A.S. No. 1982). 1 am unaware of any
developments that shed light on the meaning of the word "claim." It might mean a mere
request for a mutual agreement proceeding. But perhaps it requires that the taxpayer have
a ripe claim for a grievance, as opposed to a possible grievance.
56. See Avery Jones, Berg, Depret, Ellis, Fontaneau, Lenz, Miyatake, Roberts,
Sandels, Strobl & Ward, The Legal Nature of the Mutual Agreement Procedure Under the
OECD Model Convention-I, 1979 BRIT. TAX Rnv. 333, 334-36 [hereinafter cited as Avery
Jones I]. Rev. Rul. 72-437, 1972-2 C.B. 660, illustrates how a mutual agreement may
appear to operate legislatively. The United States has a three-year statute of limitations for
most tax matters. If a mutual agreement that produces a refund or credit is concluded after
three years, the Internal Revenue Service might be able to avoid paying it. However, in
Rev. Rul. 72-437 the Service concluded that the Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation, July 22, 1954, United States-Federal Republic of Germany, 5 U.S.T. 2768,
T.I.A.S. No. 3133, permitted a payment beyond this period. The Service relied on a Mem-
orandum of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation that indicated that this
result was intended. Rev. Rul. 72-437, supra, at 660-61. It was not clear, however, that the
converse was intended. Thus, a mutual agreement concluded after three years probably
could not produce an enforceable deficiency.
57. See Avery Jones I, supra note 56, passim.
58. See Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at § 31.03[2].
59. Id
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This formulation of the power of mutual agreement authorities would
be easier to accept if one could confidently define "leeway, .... practi-
cal," and the concept of negotiating principle "to some extent." Mr.
Rosenbloom makes clear that he believes that as a general matter a
treaty should not be treated as an inflexible statute, as he thinks the
Internal Revenue Service does. 60 However, he never articulates a basis
in the language of United States treaties for giving the competent
authorities greater interpretative license than is permitted to a court.61
Prior to the adoption of the Freedom of Information Act,62 it was
difficult to obtain the text of agreements arising from mutual agree-
ment proceedings. In addition, it has been hard to ascertain the fre-
quency of these proceedings. 63 There is even less evidence about what
happens if the two signatories cannot agree. It appears that the Euro-
pean nations sometimes submit these disputes to ad hoe arbitration.64
A few older tax treaties provide for binding arbitration of disputes that
cannot be resolved through mutual agreement proceedings. 65
As a result of the Freedom of Information Act, the texts of U.S.
agreements generated by mutual agreement proceedings should now
become available. In fact, an agreement dated January 26, 1984,
between Canada and the United States concerning the amount of
depreciation allowable for oil drilling rigs that a U.S. resident operates
off the coast of Canada has been released.6 6 This agreement provides
that a taxpayer may elect to take accelerated depreciation deductions
for any rig that is a permanent establishment in Canada.67 Straight-
line depreciation is provided if the rig is not a permanent establish-
ment. 68 The agreement does not state whether a rig by itself normally
60. Rosenbloom states that "[t]reaties are not 'super-Codes' joining two systems with
specific and comprehensive rules." Id. at § 31.03[2], at 31-39.
61. The OECD model appears to give quasi-legislative power to competent authorities.
See Avery Jones I, supra note 56, at 334-36. For articles discussing mutual agreement
proceedings, see Avery Jones, Mutual Agreement Procedure, 34 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL
DOcUMENT'N 556 (1980); Avery Jones I, supra note 56; Avery Jones, Berg, Depret, Ellis,
Fontaneau, Lenz, Migatake, Roberts, Sandels, Strobl & Ward, The Legal Nature of the
Mutual Agreement Procedure Under the OECD Model Convention-I, 1980 BRIT. TAX
REV. 13 [hereinafter cited as Avery Jones II].
62. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1982)).
63. One group of commentators has compiled data for the 1970s that indicates that
mutual agreement proceedings are not very common. See Avery Jones II, supra note 61, at
21.
64. See G. LINDENCRONA & N. MA~rsSON, ARBITRATION IN TAXATION 26-28
(1981).
65. Id. at 23.
66. Agreement on Taxation of Income from Offshore Drilling, Jan. 26, 1984, United
States-Canada, reprinted in 4 CAN. TAX REP. (CCH) 30,229 (1984).
67. Id. at paras. 2, 4.
68. Id. at para. 4. The agreement may also cover the situation in which the U.S. resi-
dent has a permanent establishment in Canada in addition to the rig, and the rig's income is
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would constitute a permanent establishment under the 194269 or the
1980 United States-Canada Conventions. 70 Nor does the agreement
make clear against what income the depreciation can be deducted, that
is, what income is taxable in Canada, if the rig is not a permanent
establishment and if the U.S. resident has no other permanent
establishment.
This oil rig depreciation agreement does more than resolve a dis-
pute between a taxpayer and one nation's revenue authorities. How-
ever, it does not appear to be legislative in character. Rather, it
interprets the Conventions' provisions for deductions from business
profits by establishing the amount of, and procedure for obtaining,
deductions for oil rig depreciation. It is, therefore, consistent with a
limited view of the role of mutual agreement proceedings.
C. INTERPRETATION BY COURTS
Interpretation of tax treaties also occurs in courts. A taxpayer
may litigate the meaning of a treaty instead of seeking a mutual agree-
ment proceeding or after such a proceeding ends in disagreement or
failure. 71 A taxpayer usually asserts his interpretation of a treaty first
with the revenue bureaucracy and, if necessary, in the courts of the
contracting state that is not his home state. Therefore, most of the
cases discussed in this Article involve people or entities "foreign" to
the forum jurisdiction.72
This Article assumes that taxpayers, competent authorities, and
courts in all three countries should interpret treaties in the same fash-
ion. However, only the naive would fail to see that role differentiation
might produce results favorable to taxpayers in the hands of taxpayers
and their advisors and results favorable to the government or govern-
ments in mutual agreement proceedings. At least judicial interpreta-
tion should proceed along similar lines in Canada, the United States,
and the United Kingdom. It is true that results may not always be
identical because of the open-textured nature of many treaty provi-
sions. It is also true that the courts of Canada and the United King-
dom do not consider preparatory legislative materials when
attributable to that establishment. In this situation, Canada has the right to tax the rig's
income.
69. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, May 4, 1942, United States-
Canada, 56 Stat. 1399, T.S. No. 983, superseded by 1980 United States-Canada Convention,
supra note 4 (effective January 1, 1985) [hereinafter cited as 1942 United States-Canada
Convention].
70. 1980 United States-Canada Convention, supra note 4.
71. See, eg., Rev. Proc. 70-18, 1970-2 C.B. 493, 498.
72. The few cases involving taxpayers domiciled in the forum nation concern liability
for withholding taxes or determinations of the foreign tax credit. See infra notes 113-26,
195-98 and accompanying text.
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interpreting a treaty,73 whereas courts in the United States rely on
such materials. This difference in approach may lead to some differing
results. Nevertheless, treaties, particularly the joint treaties of the
three nations, should be interpreted commonly in the absence of treaty
language that contemplates different results in accordance with the
nontreaty law of the source jurisdiction.74
V
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A TAX TREATY
AND A SIGNATORY'S REVENUE LAWS
WHEN THE UNDERLYING
REVENUE LAWS CHANGE
In all three nations, a tax treaty is "law" on which the residents
and corporations of one signatory nation may rely against the other
signatory nation, but generally not against their domiciliary nation.75
The underlying revenue law is also "law," however, and frequently the
two come into conflict because of a change in domestic revenue legisla-
tion after the effective date of a treaty.
A. LEGISLATIVE POWER To NULLIFY A TREATY
The jurisprudence of each of the three nations accords to its legis-
lature a degree of lawmaking power that permits the abrogation of
part or all of a treaty, without regard to the treaty's provisions for
termination or to the effectiveness of such an abrogation under inter-
73. Ward II, supra note 1, at 549.
74. Another method of interpreting tax treaties is to issue interpretive regulations. A
leading case on the permissible scope of interpretive regulations is Samann v. Commis-
sioner, 313 F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 1963), in which the court upheld a Treasury Regulation
arising under the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, May 24, 1951, United
States-Switzerland, 2 U.S.T. 1751, T.I.A.S. No. 2361 [hereinafter cited as 1951 United
States-Switzerland Convention]. The regulation provided that the maintenance of a perma-
nent establishment at any time within a taxable year would constitute the maintenance of a
permanent etablishment for the entire taxable year. The Convention merely provided that
a person "not having a permanent establishment in the former State shall be exempt from
taxation in such former State." Id. at art. VIII. The Convention also provided that "the
two contracting States may prescribe regulations necessary to carry into effect the present
Convention within the respective States." Id. at art. XIX. The court held that although
"the Treasury cannot contract or expand an international compact," it may interpret a
treaty. 313 F.2d at 463. The court also found that the failure of Swiss and other European
authorities to object to this interpretation of the permanent establishment concept indicated
their approval. Id. at 463-64.
75. Thus, the 1975 United States-United Kingdom Convention, supra note 2, provides
that each signatory may tax its residents "as if this Convention had not come into effect."
Id. at art. 1(3). In the situations in which a corporation has dual residence, only a few of
the Convention's provisions can give rise to a claim for "relief or exemption." Id. at art.
1(2), amended by Additional Protocol, Aug. 26, 1976, art. 1, 31 U.S.T. 5668, 5704, T.I.A.S.
No. 9682, at 37. One such situation is the creditability of the Petroleum Revenue Tax
under Article 1 of the Convention, which is made applicable to U.S. citizens and residents
by I.R.C. § 894 (1982).
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national law. Unilateral termination may give rise to a legal claim in a
competent international tribunal, such as the International Court of
Justice. However, because that tribunal has jurisdiction only with the
consent of the parties, 76 international law provides no effective remedy
for unilateral termination. 77
1. United States: FIRPTA and Stapled Entities
A recent, hotly disputed, unilateral legislative nullification of
treaty language occurred when the United States passed the Foreign
Investment in Real Property Tax Act of 1980 (FIRPTA).78 This Act
added I.R.C. section 89779 and other statutory provisions80 that repre-
sent a substantial break with past tax treatment of foreign investments
in U.S. real estate. Section 897 treats gains or losses on sales and cer-
tain other dispositions of U.S. real property interests as gains or losses
that are effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business
within the United States.8' This ensures that such gains or losses will
be treated as U.S. business income, rather than being taxed as periodi-
cal income or not being taxed at all if the taxpayer fails to meet certain
presence requirements in the United States. 82
76. Article 36(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides,
The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and
all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in trea-
ties and conventions in force.
A signatory to a tax treaty could argue that the signing of the treaty constitutes "deemed"
consent to the Court's jurisdiction. The United States made a similar argument in connec-
tion with its litigation against Iran following Iran's seizure of the U.S. hostages. See In re
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 1, 24-27
(Judgment of May 24). No tax treaty that I am aware of provides that disputes may or
shall be heard by the International Court of Justice.
77. To remedy this situation, Lindencrona and Mattsson have proposed a binding arbi-
tral procedure to resolve treaty conflicts. See G. LINDENCRONA & N. MAmTSSON, supra
note 64, at 59-65.
78. Pub. L. No. 96-499, tit. XI, subtit. C, 94 Stat. 2599, 2682-91 (codified in scattered
sections of I.R.C. (1982)).
79. Pub. L. No. 96-499, sec. 1122(a), § 897, 94 Stat. at 2682-87.
80. The Act added I.R.C. § 6039C which imposes certain reporting obligations on for-
eign persons holding direct investments in United States real property interests. Pub. L.
No. 96-499, sec. 1123(a), § 6039C, 94 Stat. at 2687-89 (current version at I.R.C. § 6039C
(West Supp. 1985)). In 1984, Congress went further and imposed withholding obligations
on certain transferees in the case of any disposition of a United States real property interest.
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, sec.129(a)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 655-59
(codified at I.R.C. § 1445 (West Supp. 1985)).
81. I.R.C. § 897(a) (1982).
82. The old method for taxing such gains in the absence of a treaty is set forth at I.R.C.
§ 871(a)(2) (1982). This method is still applicable to non-real estate capital gains earned by
nonresident alien individuals. The individual pays a 30% tax on such gains if he was "pres-
ent in the United States for a period or periods aggregating 183 days or more" in a taxable
year. Id. There was no analogue to I.R.C. § 871(a)(2) for a foreign corporation. There-
fore, such gains were taxable only if they were "effectively connected with the conduct of a
trade or business within the United States." I.R.C. § 882(a)(1) (1982).
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Section 897 took effect immediately as a matter of domestic law
and for nonresident aliens not subject to any treaty. Many treaties in
effect at the time of the passage of the Act tracked or bettered the pre-
FIRPTA treatment of non-trade or business real property gains and
losses. Thus, the enactment of section 897 threatened to make treat-
ment under those treaties extraordinarily favorable. As a conse-
quence, Congress decided to nullify unilaterally all contrary treaty
provisions as of January 1, 1985,83 unless the parties renegotiated the
treaty in light of the FIRPTA change.84
An even more aggressive U.S. nullification of contrary treaty pro-
visions occurred in 1984. The Deficit Reduction Act of 198485 created
I.R.C. section 269B,86 which provides that a foreign corporation that
is a "stapled entity" 87 with respect to a domestic corporation "shall be
treated as a domestic corporation. ' 88 Thus, the United States will tax
the foreign corporation's income without regard to its source, even if
the foreign corporation has no connection to the United States except
the stapling.
Because section 269B nullifies, although in a limited number of
cases, a fundamental characteristic of international taxation, that is,
the separate foreign identity of a nonresident foreign corporation, one
would suppose that the change would be phased in, as the FIRPTA
changes were. Section 269B(d) provides, however, that "[n]othing in
83. This abrogation of contrary treaty provisions had the potential of conflicting with
I.R.C. § 894(a) (1982), which establishes the supremacy of treaty exemption language. As
a matter of statutory interpretation, the later provision, I.R.C. § 897, might be deemed to
control the earlier provision, I.R.C. § 894. Nonetheless, Congress explicitly amended
I.R.C. §§ 894(a) and 7852(d) in enacting I.R.C. § 897. See Pub. L. No. 96-499,
§ 1125(c)(1), 94 Stat. at 2690.
84. If the parties negotiate a new provision that is signed before January 1, 1985, then
I.R.C. § 897, or the new supervening treaty provision, will apply to treaty nationals on the
effective date of the new provision, but in no event may this date be after December 31,
1986. If the parties attempt to negotiate a new treaty and fail to sign it before January 1,
1985, then January 1, 1985 will be the effective date of I.R.C. § 897. See Pub. L. No. 96-
499, § 1255(c)(2), 94 Stat. at 2690-91.
85. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified in scattered sections of I.R.C. (West
Supp. 1985)).
86. Pub. L. No. 98-369, see. 136(a), § 269B, 98 Stat. at 669-70.
87. Entities are considered stapled if more than 50% in value of the beneficial owner-
ship of each are "stapled interests," meaning that "by reason of form of ownership, restric-
tions on transfer, or other terms or conditions, in connection with the transfer of 1 of such
interests the other such interests are also transferred or required to be transferred." I.R.C.
§ 269B(c) (West Supp. 1985). Stapling is a technique for avoiding controlled foreign corpo-
ration status and obtaining other unrelated domestic advantages. For example, in Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 7839012 (June 27, 1978) (available on LEXIS, Fedtax library, PR file), which
preceded the adoption of I.R.C. § 269B, the taxpayer contended that the stapling was not
prompted by tax avoidance motives, but was necessary to make its foreign sales affiliate
acceptable to European customers. The Ruling recognized that the stapled foreign corpo-
ration was separate from its domestic counterpart. See id. at paras. 10-11. This would no
longer be the result under I.R.C. § 269B.
88. I.R.C. § 269B(a)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
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section 894 or 7852(d) or in any other provision of law shall be con-
strued as permitting an exemption, by reason of any treaty obligation
of the United States heretofore or hereafter entered into, from the pro-
visions of this section."'8 9 The Act alsb provides that section 269B(d)
shall not apply to any entity that was stapled as of June 30, 1983.90
Thus, treaties are nullified except with respect to those taxpayers
audacious enough to have engaged in the stapling strategem before
Congress moved to eliminate it. Section 269B can be explained as an
effort by Congress to close a perceived loophole that treaty partners
probably did not anticipate, much less negotiate, in the process of
treaty drafting. At the same time, section 269B is very broad and
gives the Treasury the power to issue regulations that treaty partners
might argue strike at important features of treaties and, therefore, con-
stitutes another display of congressional high-handedness. 91 The sta-
pled stock provision illustrates, as does FIRPTA, that subsequent
legislation may overrule contrary treaty provisions.
2. United Kingdom and Canada: WOODEND
The unlimited power of the British Parliament is so universally
understood that it is difficult to imagine that anyone would challenge,
or that the courts would need to determine, Parliament's power to
abrogate a treaty for domestic purposes. However, the Privy Council
addressed this issue and recognized broad parliamentary power in
89. Id. at § 269B(d).
90. Pub. L. No. 98-369, sec. 136(c)(5), 98 Stat. at 671. The Act also provided a new,
seemingly mechanical definition of a nonresident alien. Pub. L. No. 98-369, sec. 138(a),
§ 7701(b), 98 Stat. at 672-76 (codified at I.R.C. § 7701(b) (West Supp. 1985)). This provi-
sion appears to be generally applicable and might be thought to override certain treaty
provisions. The Conference Report, however, indicates the opposite intent.
The conferees do not intend that the conference agreement override treaty obli-
gations of the United States. For example, an alien who is a resident of the United
States under the new statutory definition but who is a resident of a treaty partner of
the United States (and not a resident of the United States) under a United States
income tax treaty will be eligible for the benefits that the treaty extends to residents
of the treaty partner. However, notwithstanding the treatment of the alien as a
resident of the other country for treaty purposes, the conference agreement will
treat the alien as a U.S. resident for purposes of the internal tax laws of the United
States. For example, if the alien owns more than 50 percent of the voting power of
a foreign corporation, the foreign corporation will be a controlled foreign corpora-
tion (see. 957).
H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 967. This subtle approach to treaty benefit preser-
vation is consistent with the approach discerned below. See infra notes 127-41 and accom-
panying text.
91. Most significantly, I.R.C. § 269B and, presumably, any regulations issued under it
disregard the foreign status of the stapled entity. Even if the stapled entity is not engaged
in the conduct of a U.S. trade or business, it is treated as a domestic corporation. I.R.C.
§ 269B(a)(1). This rule contradicts the rule of most treaties that an entity of one con-
tracting state may not be taxed on its business profits derived in the other contracting state
unless it has a permanent establishment in that other contracting state. See, e.g., 1980
United States-Canada Convention, supra note 4, at art. VII(l).
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Woodend (K. V Ceylon) Rubber & Tea Co. v. Commissioner of Inland
Revenue,92 a case involving a treaty-statute conflict in a Common-
wealth country.
In 1950, the United Kingdom and Ceylon, now Sri Lanka, signed
an Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation,93 which Ceylon
proceeded to enact as positive law. The Agreement provided:
The residents of one of the territories shall not be subjected in the other terri-
tory to any taxation or any requirement connected therewith which is other,
higher or more burdensome than the taxation and connected requirements to
which the residents of the latter territory are or may be subjected.94
In 1959, Ceylon substantially increased its tax rates and changed its
method of taxing businesses.
The Rubber and Tea Company, which was managed in Britain,
was engaged in various agricultural pursuits in Ceylon but was consid-
ered a nonresident enterprise under the new tax. The Privy Council,
following the decision of the Supreme Court of Ceylon, held that the
new taxes to which the Rubber Company was subjected were not
"higher or more burdensome" than those imposed on residents.95 The
Privy Council found, however, that one of the new taxes was "other"
than a tax imposed on a resident enterprise. 96 Because this tax was
"other" taxation, the 1959 Act was pro tanto in conflict with the 1950
Agreement. 97 The Council applied the maxim that specific language
in a later statute is deemed to repeal general language in a prior stat-
ute. Because the Act and the Agreement were irreconcilable, the
Council held that the Act repealed the Agreement. The Council rea-
soned, "It is unlikely that in the course of preparing [the Act,] agree-
ments such as the 1950 agreement would have been completely
overlooked .... "198
Woodend involved subtler facts than the FIRPTA and stapling
episodes. It follows, however, that if the Parliament of Ceylon can
nullify a tax treaty by implication, then it can do so directly. It must
also follow that the Parliament at Westminister can do the same.
Although Woodend is only persuasive authority in Canada, the
Supreme Court of Canada has approved the Privy Council's conclu-
sion in dictum.99
92. [1971] 1 A.C. 321 (P.C. 1970) (Ceylon).
93. July 26, 1950, United Kingdom-Ceylon, 337 U.N.T.S. 77.
94. Id. at art. XVIII(1).
95. [1971] 1 A.C. at 332.
96. The offending tax was imposed on any "remittances" that a nonresident company
made abroad. Id
97. Id.
98. Id. at 334-35.
99. See The Queen v. Melford Devs. Inc., 139 D.L.R.3d 577, 586-87 (Can. 1982).
Until 1949, an appeal could be taken from a decision in the Supreme Court of Canada and
certain provincial courts to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London. A
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B. GENERAL STATUTORY CHANGE IN RELATION TO ARGUABLY
CONTRARY TREATY LANGUAGE
In the cases of FIRPTA and stapled entities, Congress explicitly
nullified existing treaty provisions. In Woodend, the Privy Council
held that a major statutory change in the scheme of taxation that is
directly repugnant to treaty language will overrule the treaty. In most
instances the clash between a treaty and a statute is less obvious. The
treaty speaks in broad terms, and the legislature has made a general
and relatively insignificant change in the revenue laws. This change is
made without giving much, if any, thought to foreign taxpayers and
their particular problems, let alone the language of particular treaties.
Further complications result from the fact that the language of the
treaty may be so general that it is not even clear that there is a conflict.
It should be apparent that treaties cannot be read to require the
halting of underlying changes in the revenue laws on which the treaty
rests. On the other hand, to the extent that the treaty is designed to
secure special treatment or exemption for a nonresident, a change in
domestic law that threatens the exemption gives rise to an issue of the
relationship of domestic law to the treaty. For example, virtually all
treaties provide that the business profits of an enterprise of one con-
tracting state may be taxed by the other state only as explicitly pro-
vided in the treaty. 100 Thus, a domestic law that imposes new taxation
on the business profits of an enterprise of the other signatory state
conflicts with a tax treaty unless the new law expressly overrides the
treaty or unless the treaty's language has some elasticity.
The rest of this section considers cases in which a change in the
underlying revenue laws conflicted with treaty language or threatened
to make a treaty provision useless. In these cases, the courts employed
various theories to explain why a treaty should be interpreted one way
or another. The resulting theories are inconsistent among themselves
and frequently are internally incoherent.
In Estate of Burghardt v. Commissioner,10 1 the Tax Court of the
United States considered whether a general legislative change should
be read into a provision of the 1955 Estate Tax Convention 10 2 between
Canadian federal statute eliminated this possibility as of December 23, 1949, although cases
commenced before this date could still be appealed. Act of Dec. 10, 1949, ch. 37, § 3, 1949
Can. Stat. (2d Sess.) 247, 249-50. Canada's proposed action was upheld by the Privy Coun-
cil before the enactment of the Canadian statute in Attorney-General for Ont. v. Attorney-
General for Can., [1947] A.C. 127 (P.C.) (Can.). Privy Council decisions before the change
remain part of the corpus of Canadian precedent, while those after it are merely persuasive.
See P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 127-29 (1977).
100. See, eg., 1975 United States-United Kingdom Convention, supra note 2, at art. 7.
101. 80 T.C. 705 (1983), affid mem., 734 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1984).
102. Estate Tax Convention, Mar. 30, 1955, United States-Italy, 7 U.S.T. 2977, T.I.A.S.
No. 3678 [hereinafter cited as 1955 United States-Italy Estate Tax Convention]. Although
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the United States and Italy. That Convention provides that an Italian
resident, not a U.S. citizen but subject to U.S. estate taxation, is enti-
tled to a prorated specific exemption from estate taxes.103 At the time
the treaty was adopted, U.S. law provided that up to $60,000 of a U.S.
resident's estate was sheltered from taxation by a specific exemp-
tion.104 Estates that fell within the provisions of the treaty qualified
for a proportion of this exemption based on the proportion of U.S.
property in the estate.10 5 After the treaty entered into force and before
the death of Charlotte Burghardt, a non-U.S. citizen residing in Italy
who owned United States property, the United States replaced the spe-
cific exemption with a unified credit.10 6 The unified credit in 1978, the
year of Mrs. Burghardt's death, was $34,000 for a U.S. citizen or
resident. 107
The Internal Revenue Service argued that Mrs. Burghardt's
United States ancillary administrator could only avail himself of the
very limited unified credit of $3600108 accorded to the estates of
deceased nonresident aliens not covered by more advantageous treaty
provisions.'0 9 The administrator countered that the 1955 treaty was
intended to provide a proportion of the then-existing full specific
exemption. Furthermore, the 1976 unified credit changes should be
read into the words "specific exemption," as used in the Italian treaty,
thereby enabling the estate to take advantage of the full unified credit
for citizens and residents." 0
The Tax Court agreed with the administrator:
The basic aim of treaty interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the par-
ties .... Courts must "give the specific words of a treaty a meaning consis-
tent with the genuine shared expectations of the contracting parties." . . .
this Article focuses on income tax treaties, Canada, the United States, and the United
Kingdom are also signatories to a number of estate tax treaties. The Canadian estate tax
treaties are for the most part moribund because of the Canadian federal government's
repeal of its estate tax law. Act of Dec. 23, 1971, ch. 63, pt. II, § 2, 1970-1972 Can. Stat.
1311, 1910. See, eg., 1980 United States-Canada Convention, supra note 4, at art. XXX(8)
(declaring the Estate Tax Convention, Feb. 17, 1961, United States-Canada, 13 U.S.T. 382,
T.I.A.S. No. 4995, nugatory for decedents dying after December 31, 1984).
103. 1955 United States-Italy Estate Tax Convention, supra note 102, at art. IV(a).
104. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 2052, 68A Stat. 1, 389, repealed by Tax
Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, sec. 2001(a)(4), 90 Stat. 1520, 1848.
105. 1955 United States-Italy Estate Tax Convention, supra note 102, at art. IV(a).
106. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94455, sec. 2001(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1846-49
(codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2010, 2035 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985)).
107. See Pub. L. No. 94-455, sec. 2001(a)(2), § 2010(b), 90 Stat. at 1848 (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 2010(b) (1982)).
108. I.R.C. § 2102(c)(1) (1982).
109. 80 T.C. at 706-07.
110. Id. at 707. "Petitioner argues that the phrase 'specific exemption' is a general term
that describes the level at which estate taxation begins." IL In fact, the concept of a
specific exemption came from old I.R.C. § 2052. See Rev. Rul. 81-303, 1981-2 C.B. 255,
255, which had previously construed the phrase "specific exemption" not to refer to the
new unified credit in the context of seven estate tax treaties, including the Italian treaty.
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When treaties are ambiguous, they are to be construed "in a broad and liberal
spirit, one which prefers the favoring of rights granted under it over a restric-
tive view of those rights." '111
The Tax Court, perhaps inconsistently, sees two major rules in
tax treaty interpretation. First, the court views a treaty as a contract
more than a statute and focuses attention on the parties' intentions.
Presumably, the court believes that contracts can be interpreted more
liberally than statutes, at least when the intentions of the parties are
discernible. 112 Second, the court seeks to preserve the rights the treaty
secures. Thus, it might be expected that the Tax Court will stretch
treaty language to favor the taxpayer over the Treasury.
The Tax Court's eclecticism and willingness to look at a treaty
primarily as a contractual agreement contrasts sharply with the 1982
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in The Queen v. Melford
Developments, Inc.113 Melford borrowed money from the Bank of
Nova Scotia. A German bank that was not a Canadian enterprise or
resident guaranteed the loan. Melford paid the German bank a one-
percent loan guaranty fee. Revenue Canada asserted that the fee con-
stituted a payment of interest from which Melford was required to
withhold tax 1 4 pursuant to the Income Tax Act 15 and the 1956 Can-
ada-West Germany Convention. 116 At the time the Convention was
signed, guaranty fees were not treated as interest under Canadian tax
law. However, a 1975 amendment to the Income Tax Act provided
that guaranty fees were thereafter deemed to be interest." 17
Melford claimed that "interest," as used in the Convention, did
not include guaranty fees, because they were not interest under Cana-
dian law in 1956. If the income was not interest, it could only have
111. 80 T.C. at 708 (quoting Maximov v. United States, 299 F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir.
1962), Samann v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 1011, 1014-15 (1961)) (citation and footnote
omitted).
112. Courts that suggest that a tax convention should be interpreted as a contract rather
than a statute generally do not explain the consequences of such a distinction. It would
appear that such a distinction is employed to justify a free-wheeling interpretation. The
probable logic for this approach is that a contract is presumed to represent a meeting of the
minds. Therefore, a court is empowered to interpret contractual language more loosely to
effectuate that meaning. By contrast, a statute is the work of one or more hands. While
courts attempt to discern and employ legislative intent, at least in the United States, see
supra text accompanying note 73, they are more constrained by the language actually
selected.
113. 139 D.L.R.3d 577 (Can. 1982).
114. Id. at 578.
115. Act of Dec. 23, 1971, ch.63, pt. I, §§ 212(1)(b), 215, 1970-1972 Can. Stat. 1311,
1816-19, 1832-34 (amended 1973, 1975, 1977 & 1981).
116. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, June 4, 1956, Canada-Federal
Republic of Germany, 1957 Can. T.S. No. 12, 316 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter cited as 1956
Canada-West Germany Convention].
117. Act of Mar. 13, 1975, ch. 26, see. 119(2), 1974-1976 Can. Stat. 389, 655 (adding
§ 214(15)).
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been subject to Canadian taxation if it constituted business profits of
the German bank earned through a permanent establishment. By
agreement of the parties, the German bank did not have a permanent
establishment in Canada.
Melford relied upon the language of effectuation in the statute
that enacted the 1956 Convention as support for its argument. Section
3 of the statute provided, "In the event of any inconsistency between
the provisions of this Act, or the Agreement, and the operation of any
other law, the provisions of this Act and the Agreement prevail to the
extent of the inconsistency."118 In addition, the Convention provided
that undefined terms, such as interest, shall have the same meaning
that they have under the nontreaty laws of the contracting
countries. 1 19
In his opinion for the Supreme Court, Justice Estey stated forth-
rightly that Parliament could amend or repeal the 1956 Act if it so
chose.120 However, no such intention was evidenced at the time of the
amendment of the Income Tax Act in 1975 with respect to guaranty
fees. Justice Estey limited the scope of the Court's decision by holding
that the effectuation language and the Convention did not freeze
Canadian procedural tax law.121 With respect to substantive tax law,
any domestic legislation that increases the tax burden on a taxpayer
who is protected by a treaty is without effect unless Parliament
expressly states such an intention. The Court held:
[T]he effect of [section] 3 is to make the operation of any other law of Parlia-
ment, including the Income Tax Act, subject to the terms of the 1956 Act and
the incorporated agreement. . . . Thus any legislative action taken for
whatever reason which results in a change or expansion of a definition of a
term such as "interest" does not prevail over the terms of the 1956 statute
because of the necessary meaning of [section] 3 thereof. 122
Justice Estey did not expound a particular theory of tax treaty
interpretation. He rejected any analogy to Woodend, because in
Woodend there was actual or constructive intent to repeal or to replace
inconsistent portions of the United Kingdom-Ceylon agreement. 23
118. Canada-Federal Republic of Germany Income Tax Agreement Act, ch. 33, § 3,
1956 Can. Stat. 191, 191.
119. 139 D.L.R. 3d at 579. Article 11(2) of the 1956 Canada-West Germany Conven-
tion, supra note 116, stated,
In the application of the provisions of this Convention by one of the contracting
States any term not otherwise defined in this Convention shall, unless the context
otherwise requires, have the meaning which it has under the laws in force in the
territory of that State relating to the taxes which are the subject of this Convention.
120. 139 D.L.R.3d at 584.
121. Id. at 583. One cannot be exactly sure of the dividing line between procedural and
substantive tax law. Presumably Justice Estey meant that things like the date for filing a
return were not frozen by the treaty.
122. Id. at 584-85.
123. Id. at 586-87.
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There was no evidence of such intention in Canada's 1975 amendment
of its Income Tax Act.124
Melford renders the operation of bilateral tax treaties extremely
difficult. The Court assumed that the maximum content of an unde-
fined term, such as "interest," with respect to treaty nationals, is fro-
zen at its meaning on the date of the treaty's enactment. However, no
nation that negotiates a treaty assumes that such generally used terms
are immutable. Indeed, most negotiators probably believe that general
terms such as "interest" will 'breathe along with the underlying law.
The absence of definitions of these terms while other terms are specifi-
cally defined implies that the general terms were intended to be
elastic.12 5
Although not articulated as such, Justice Estey seems to view a
tax treaty primarily as a statute that freezes the maximum content of
the law as of the moment of effectuation, except when the treaty
explicitly eschews such a freezing. This approach contrasts with the
contract and rights notions of the U.S. Tax Court in Burghardt and
would entail significant administrative problems. 126
The decisions in Burghardt and Melford were favorable to the
taxpayer. It should not be surprising that in administrative rulings the
revenue officials who must interpret treaty language in light of statu-
tory changes will arrive at different conclusions, using some or all of
the same interpretative techniques. A leading example is United
124. Id.
125. In a case that superficially resembles Melford, The Queen v. Amos, 36 D. Tax 6165
(Fed. Ct. App. Can. 1982), the Federal Court of Appeal of Canada concluded that the 1942
United States-Canada Convention, supra note 69, as amended by the Supplemental Con-
vention, June 12, 1950, United States-Canada, art. I(i), 2 U.S.T. 2235, 2239, T.I.A.S. No.
2347, at 6, prevented the recapture of previously deducted capital allowances. The deduc-
tions were taken to reduce rental income from property previously owned by a resident
trustee and then distributed to nonresident trustees who actually effected the sale of the
property. The major difference between this case and Melford is that Article XIIIA(2) of
the amended Convention provided,
Rentals from real property derived from sources within Canada by an individual or
corporation resident in the United States of America shall receive tax treatment by
Canada not less favorable than that accorded under Section 99, The Income Tax
Act, as in effect on the date on which this Article goes into effect.
Thus, the immunity from capital allowance recapture that the taxpayer in Amos sought is
supported by the specific language of the treaty and is substantially clearer than the immu-
nity approved in Melford.
The Canadian government has proposed legislation that would reverse the result in cases
like Melford. The proposed legislation and its retroactive aspects are discussed in McCart
& Morris, The Income Tax Act Conventions Interpretation Act-Unilateral Treaty Amend-
ment, 31 CAN. TAX J. 1022 (1983) (Part I), 32 CAN. TAX J. 98 (1984) (Part II).
126. For example, with approximately 40 treaties, Revenue Canada would have to
accommodate the variations likely to exist in the use of the words "interest" or "deduc-
tion" based on different treaty effective dates and dates of legislative changes.
[Vol. 17:255
INTERPRETING TAX TREATIES
States General Counsel Memorandum 35472 (GCM 35472).127 The
main focus of this Memorandum was to apply a major change in the
tax rules resulting from the passage of the Foreign Investors Tax Act
of 1966128 to the language of the 1951 United States-Switzerland
Convention. 129
Prior to the adoption of the 1966 Act, the Internal Revenue
Code, in the absence of a treaty, provided that when a nonresident
alien individual or foreign corporation became engaged in a trade or
business within the United States, all of his or its U.S. source income,
whether it was business income or separate investment income, would
be gathered together by "force of attraction" and taxed as regular
income. 130 The 1966 Act, in response to complaints by foreign inves-
tors and major U.S. trading partners, dropped the force of attraction
rule. The Act provided instead that fixed or determinable annual or
periodical gains and income that were not related to a foreign tax-
payer's U.S. trade or business would be taxed at a fiat thirty percent
rate. 131 However, the Code retained the force of attraction rule for all
business income that was derived from U.S. sources after a taxpayer
became engaged, to any extent, in a trade or business within the
United States. 132 This new set of statutory rules is known as the
"effectively connected" regime. 133
Many treaties that were negotiated during the era of the force of
attraction rule, including the Swiss treaty, recognized the rule. Thus,
under this treaty any U.S. source income could be attributed to a per-
manent establishment, 134 if one existed. When Congress repealed the
force of attraction rule with the 1966 Act, it added section 894(b) to
the Code. 135 Section 894(b) provides that any prior treaty that incor-
porated the force of attraction rule would be unilaterally altered to
sever income that was effectively connected with a trade or business
127. General Counsel Memorandum 35472 (undated) (available on LEXIS, Fedtax
Library, GCM file).
128. Pub. L. No. 89-809, tit. I, 80 Stat. 1539, 1541 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of I.R.C. (1982)).
129. 1951 United States-Switzerland Convention, supra note 74.
130. See Ross, United States Taxation of Aliens and Foreign Corporations: The Foreign
Investors Tax Act of 1966 and Related Developments, 22 TAx L. Rnv. 277, 292-95 (1967)
(discussing the operation of I.R.C. §§ 871, 882 prior to the 1966 ammendments). See supra
note 43.
131. See Pub. L. No. 89-809, sees. 103(a), 104(a), 80 Stat. at 1547-50, 1555 (codified as
amended at I.R.C. §§ 871(a) (individuals), 881 (corporations) (West 1982 & Supp. 1985)).
132. See I.R.C. § 864(b), (c)(3) (1982).
133. See I.R.C. §§ 864(c), 871(b) (West 1982 & Supp. 1985).
134. A "permanent establishment" is the treaty analogue to the domestic law concept of
being engaged in a trade or business within the United States. See P. McDANIEL & H.
AULT, supra note 40, at 170-71.
135. Pub. L. No. 89-809, sec. 105(a), 80 Stat. at 1563 (codified at I.R.C. § 894(b)
(1982)). See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
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from periodical income. This was done in the belief that the change
would be beneficial to most treaty nationals.
General Counsel Memorandum 35472 described a Swiss taxpayer
who sought to benefit from the force of attraction provision in the
United States-Switzerland Convention. The taxpayer asserted that it
should not be forced to sever its effectively connected income from its
periodical income, as required by section 894(b), even though severing
the income would result in lower taxation for most treaty nationals.
Apparently, the taxpayer had effectively connected losses or such a
small amount of income that it was advantageous to tax the periodical
gains at regular business rates.
The 1966 Act included an uncodified provision, section 110,136
which provided that the extension of a benefit by operation of section
894(b) would not be deemed contrary to any treaty provision. The
taxpayer argued that section 894(b) would deny him the benefit of the
force of attraction rule. GCM 35472 rejected this position on the the-
ory that the separate taxation of periodical income at a rate of thirty
percent, which was provided by the treaty as amended by section
894(b), was the "benefit" covered by section 110 and that the taxpayer
was still guaranteed this benefit:
We do not think that preventing the taxpayer from grouping his noneffectively
connected dividend income with the income effectively connected with his
trade or business, deprives him of any benefit granted by the Income Tax Con-
vention with Switzerland. . . . This so-called "benefit" [of lower dividend tax-
ation in this case], however, was provided by Code § 871 before that section
was revised by the [1966] Act and not by the Tax Convention with Switzerland
which nowhere refers to a graduated rate of tax for dividends.1
37
General Counsel Memorandum 35472 conflicts with the words of
the Swiss Convention, which recognized the force of attraction princi-
ple independently of former I.R.C. section 871.138 Thus, the tax-
payer's argument that he had been deprived of a benefit and that I.R.C
section 894(b) should not be applied to him is quite convincing. The
Service's rejection of this argument would reduce the impact of section
110 and permit the effectively connected concept to be applied even in
the face of contrary treaty language.
Section 110 of the 1966 Act makes GCM 35472 different from
normal treaty interpretation, but this difference strengthens the tax-
payer's argument, because section 110 explicitly shelters treaties from
the Act's provisions. The rejection of the taxpayer's argument may
indicate the lengths to which revenue authorities will go in twisting
treaty language. Or one might infer from GCM 35472 that tax treaties
136. Pub. L. No. 89-809, sec. 110, 80 Stat. 1539, 1575 (1966).
137. General Counsel Memorandum 35472, supra note 127.
138. See 1951 United States-Switzerland Convention, supra note 74, at art. III(l)(a).
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are loosely worded guidelines that are accommodated and interpreted
in light of underlying developments in the revenue laws of the
signatories.
Evaluation of the results in GCM 35472 must take into account
the fact that the Memorandum considered a second, related issue and
came to a conclusion favorable to the taxpayer. The 1966 Act, in
addition to severing periodical income from effectively connected busi-
ness income, provided that in some cases income from sources without
the United States would be treated as "effectively connected" and
therefore taxable in the United States. 139 Prior to 1966, the United
States did not reach foreign source income of nonresident aliens and
foreign corporations. In GCM 35472, the taxpayer sought a determi-
nation that the treaty prevented the taxation of any foreign source
income, even though the treaty contained no explicit prohibition.
GCM 35472 held for the taxpayer on this issue:
We realize that in our consideration of the first issue of this case we reject the
taxpayer's argument, based on the old force of attraction rule. . . while in our
analysis of the second issue we rely on the force of attraction rule for our con-
clusion that all foreign-source income is exempt under the Convention. The
explanation for this apparent discrepancy is found in Code § 894(a) which
states that income, to the extent provided by a treaty, shall not be included in
gross income and shall be exempt from taxation. Since there is nothing in the
Convention requiring that dividend income be taxed at graduated rates, the
present statutory treatment of taxing non-effectively connected dividend
income at a 30 percent rate does not affect any exemption provided by a treaty
... . Therefore, the taxpayer cannot rely on Code § 894(a) to continue the
tax on his dividends at graduated rates. On the other hand, we believe Article
III(1)(a) of the Convention exempts from taxation foreign-source income of
Swiss nonresident aliens so that Code § 894(a) does come into play in deciding
the second issue in favor of the taxpayer. 140
The problem with this reasoning is that the treaty explicitly rec-
ognizes the force of attraction concept but never considers whether the
United States can tax foreign source income. 41 In addition, GCM
35472 seems to ignore the effect of section 110 of the 1966 Act. A
literal approach to treaty interpretation would have suggested the
139. Pub. L. No. 89-809, sec. 102(d), 80 Stat. at 1544-47 (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§ 864(c)(4) (1982)).
140. General Counsel Memorandum 35472, supra note 127.
141. The first sentence of Article III(l)(a), on which the Memorandum relies, merely
states, "A Swiss enterprise shall not be subject to taxation by the United States in respect of
its industrial and commercial profits unless it is engaged in trade or business in the United
States through a permanent establishment situated therein." 1951 United States-Switzer-
land Convention, supra note 74, at art. III(1)(a). Thus, it does not recognize explicitly that
foreign source income can never be taxed by the United States. By contrast, the second
sentence explicitly recognizes the force of attraction principle. "If it is so engaged the
United States may impose its tax upon the entire income of such enterprise from sources
within the United States." Id.
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opposite result on each issue. GCM 35472 offers no theory, purpose,
or policy concerning treaty interpretation to justify its results.
In sum, Burghardt, Melford, and GCM 35472 show that treaty
language is treated as a guidepost but is not applied literally. In Burg-
hardt, the Tax Court of the United States attempted to fathom the
signatories' purposes as if the agreement were a contract and sought to
protect the "rights" of affected taxpayers. In Melford, the Supreme
Court of Canada froze the word "interest," as used in the 1956 Can-
ada-West Germany Convention, at its meaning on the effective date of
the treaty, even though the treaty and the enabling legislation con-
tained no explicit freezing provision. Finally, GCM 35472 suggests
that explicit treaty language may be swept aside by a general legisla-
tive change, even when the later statute contains a saving clause.
GCM35472 also suggests, inconsistently, that treaty language may not
be disregarded without express language of nullification, by virtue of
the saving clause in I.R.C. section 894(a).
Unfortunately, the best that can be gleaned from these cases is
inconsistency of result and incoherence of theory. This is not to say
that they are wrong or that no theory can explain the results. The
peculiarity of these cases may illustrate the truism that hard cases
make bad law. These are cases in which a legislature has passed legis-
lation that unintentionally nullifies a treaty provision. In the context
of such strains, the courts labor hard to produce results that they see
as "just" but for which the justifications seem weak. As will be seen
shortly, 142 an approach that draws these cases together can best be
seen in a context in which the interpretation of ambiguous treaty lan-
guage is not accompanied by an alteration of the underlying revenue
laws.
VI
TREATY INTERPRETATION NOT IN THE
CONTEXT OF A CHANGE IN THE
UNDERLYING REVENUE LAWS
Were it not for the fact that revenue laws change frequently,
Burghardt, Melford, and GCM 35472 would be extraordinary cases.
Even with rapid statutory change, the more common case of treaty
interpretation involves determining how to apply a treaty provision in
light of unchanged revenue laws. Inland Revenue Commissioners v.
Exxon Corp. 143 is a good example of such a case. Exxon concerned
Exxon's operations in the United Kingdom, which were conducted
through a holding company, Esso Holding Co. U.K. Inc. (Holdings).
142. See infra notes 143-99 and accompanying text.
143. [1982] 1 W.L.R. 999 (Ch.).
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Holdings was a Delaware corporation, but it conducted all of its activ-
ities in the United Kingdom. Thus, for U.K. tax purposes it was a
U.K. resident and subject to U.K. taxation. At the same time, because
Holdings was a Delaware corporation, it was a "citizen" of the United
States and thus fully subject to U.S. taxation. On March 29, 1973,
Holdings paid a dividend to its parent, Exxon.1 " Article XV of the
1945 United States-United Kingdom Convention 145 provides,
Dividends and interest paid by a corporation of one Contracting Party shall be
exempt from tax by the other Contracting Party except where the recipient is a
citizen, resident, or corporation of that other Contracting Party. This exemp-
tion shall not apply if the corporation paying such dividend or interest is a
resident of the other Contracting Party.
146
Holdings argued that the dividend should be exempt from U.K. taxa-
tion under the first sentence of Article XV because Holdings and
Exxon were both U.S. corporations. In addition, Holdings noted that
it was not taken out of the first sentence by the second sentence of
Article XV, because Article II(l)(g) defined the term "resident of the
United Kingdom" to exclude a U.S. corporation. 147
Holdings' argument was difficult to refute. The Crown noted that
the term defined in Article II(l)(g), "resident of the United King-
dom," is not the exact term employed in the second sentence of Article
XV, "resident of the other Contracting Party."'14 8 The Crown argued
that the two terms should not be treated as synonymous. According
to the Crown, if the residence definitions of Article II were imported
into the second sentence of Article XV, that sentence would deprive
the United Kingdom of taxation on dividends in all similar situa-
tions. 149 If the facts were reversed, however, this result would not fol-
low, because the term "resident of the United States," as set forth in
Article II(l)(h), did not exclude U.K. corporations. The reason for
this non-parallelism in Article II was that the United Kingdom,
because of its residence-based tax system, did not attach significance to
the place of incorporation.
Thus, if the non-parallel definitions of Article II were applied in
Article XV, the exemption would not apply if a similarly situated
144. Id. at 1000.
145. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Apr. 16, 1945, United States-
United Kingdom, 60 Stat. 1377, T.I.A.S. No. 1546, superseded by 1975 United States-
United Kingdom Convention, supra note 2 [hereinafter cited as 1945 United States-United
Kingdom Convention].
146. 1945 United States-United Kingdom Convention, supra note 145, at art. XV,
amended by Supplemental Protocol, Mar. 17, 1966, art. 11, 17 U.S.T. 1254, 1263, T.I.A.S.
No. 6089, at 10.
147. See [1982] 1 W.L.R. at 1002.
148. Id. at 1001.
149. Id.
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U.K. corporation were the payor. The Crown found this result unac-
ceptable, as did Judge Goulding of the Chancery Division:
[A]lthough it seems to me that upon the plain meaning of the words used, the
expression "resident of the other contracting party" in [the second] sentence
does import the residence definitions [of Article II] . . . I must nevertheless
give it a different construction, so that it does not fail of effect. . . . [The
words of the Convention are not those of a regular parliamentary draftsman
but a text agreed upon by negotiation between the two contracting govern-
ments. Although I am thus constrained to do violence to the language of the
Convention, I see no reason to inflict a deeper wound than necessary. In other
words, I prefer to depart from the plain meaning of language only in the sec-
ond sentence of article XV, and I accept the consequence, strange though it is,
that similar words mean different things in the two sentences. 150
Judge Goulding's evaluation of his decision seems harsh albeit
refreshing. The decision makes Article XV fully operative for both
nations. The United Kingdom, with its residence system of taxation,
would want to tax the dividend from Holdings to Exxon as a matter of
domestic law. Furthermore, the United Kingdom received no explicit,
reciprocal concession from the United States in Article II or XV that
would have led it to alter this feature of domestic taxation.
The Chancery Division's decision in Exxon seems to be based on
a notion that tax treaties provide for item-by-item reciprocity between
the parties. While the presence or absence of reciprocity may guide
interpretation, it cannot be the primary touchstone of interpretation.
One nation might accept a lack of reciprocity on one item in a treaty
in return for an advantage elsewhere. Moreover, concern for real reci-
procity implies that there is a similarity between the revenue laws that
may not actually exist.
The decision of the United States Court of Claims in Brown &
Williamson, Ltd. v. United States151 illustrates the problems of
attempting to base treaty interpretation upon a notion of reciprocity.
Brown & Williamson, a British company, operated in the United
States through various subsidiaries. The subsidiaries periodically
repatriated their net earnings to the U.K. parent by paying dividends.
Under the 1945 United States-United Kingdom Convention, 52 a sub-
sidiary was required to withhold tax at a rate of fifteen percent on
dividends that were paid to its parent.' 53 The new United States-
150. Id. at 1004.
151. 688 F.2d 747 (Ct. Cl. 1982). The Service has recently announced that it will follow
the decision in Brown & Williamson. See Rev. Rul. 84-133, 1984-36 I.R.B. 25; Rev. Proc.
84-60, 1984-36 I.R.B. 28; Swenson, The IRS Reverses its Position on the Date Interest on
Refunds Under US.-UK. Treaty Commences to Run: Rev. Rul. 84-133 and Rev. Proc 84-
60, 14 TAx MGMT. INT'L J. 94 (1985).
152. 1945 United States-United Kingdom Convention, supra note 145.
153. Id. at art. VI(l), amended by Supplemental Protocol, Mar. 17, 1966, art. 4, 17
U.S.T. 1254, 1257-58, T.I.A.S. No. 6089, at 4-5.
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United Kingdom Convention, 154 which became effective in 1980,
reduced this tax retroactively to five percent for dividends that were
paid on or after January 1, 1975.155
Brown & Williamson petitioned for a refund of the excess divi-
dend taxes that its subsidiaries had paid after January 1, 1975 and
made a claim for interest. The new treaty does not require or prevent
the payment of interest on refunds. The United States pays interest in
the event of an overpayment of tax, 156 but the United Kingdom does
not. The United States argued that no overpayment obligation arose
until the new treaty came into effect on April 25, 1980, and, therefore,
interest did not begin to accrue until that date.' 57
The problem with the United States' argument was that in similar
contexts in which there has been a retroactive reduction of taxes it has
conceded that interest was due on the amount refunded.' 58 Thus, the
United States had to argue that the treaty's failure to require the pay-
ment of interest on refunds, together with certain general, precatory
provisions in the treaty, established that interest was due only from
April 25, 1980.159
The Court of Claims rejected the government's position. The
court noted that other treaties have specifically denied interest on the
refunds they generate and that such a provision was missing in this
case.' 60 Senior Judge Skelton dissented for a variety of reasons includ-
ing the absence of reciprocity in the obligation to pay interest:
On the basis of reciprocity ... a citizen of the United Kingdom, such as the
plaintiff in the instant case, who gets a tax refund from the United States
should not be able to collect interest on the refunded taxes. To hold otherwise
places an economic burden on citizens of the United States as compared to
citizens of the United Kingdom similarly situated. Obviously, the framers of
the Treaty and the governments which ratified it did not intend to discriminate
between the citizens of the two countries, nor to create a windfall for citizens of
the United Kingdom .... 161
154. 1975 United States-United Kingdom Convention, supra note 2.
155. See id. at arts. 10(2)(b)(i), 28(2)(b).
156. See I.R.C. § 6611 (West 1982 & Supp. 1985).
157. See 688 F.2d at 748.
158. Id. at 749.
159. The United States argued that "the provision that the treaty 'shall enter into force
[on April 25, 1980]' indicates that interest is not payable before that date." Id. at 751
(quoting 1975 United States-United Kingdom Convention, supra note 2, at art. 28(2)).
160. 688 F.2d at 751.
161. Id. at 765 (Skelton, J., dissenting). Judge Skelton relied on American Trust Co. v.
Smyth, 247 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1957). In Smyth, the Ninth Circuit held that capital gains
derived by a U.S.-based trust with British beneficiaries were exempt from United States
taxation by the applicable Convention to ensure "reciprocity," even though they were not
currently distributable. Id. at 152. "We conceive the purpose of the Treaty to have been
full reciprocity and equality of tax treatment between nationals of the United States and the
United Kingdom." Id. But see infra notes 171-76 and accompanying text.
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As with many things labelled "obvious," there is nothing obvious
about what Judge Skelton said. Tax treaties are not designed primar-
ily to achieve equality or reciprocity. They are used primarily to har-
monize what may be two very different tax systems. To that end, they
frequently operate in a reciprocal fashion. However, they rarely alter
the underlying tax laws. In the absence of specific language, one
would not suppose that the tax treaty between the United States and
the United Kingdom would alter the practice of one nation in paying
interest on refunds and of the other not to pay such interest. There-
fore, while reciprocity occurs often, it is not a fundamental principle,
and its logic sometimes must give way to underlying domestic revenue
laws.
Exxon suggests that reciprocity is an aid in interpreting a tax
treaty, but Brown & Williamson shows that it cannot be the primary
guide for interpretation. Exxon looks at a tax treaty as a contract.
Accordingly, the role of a court in interpreting the treaty is to discern
the intention of the parties. The holding in Brown & Williamson and
the court's choice not to articulate the contract analogy suggest that in
its view the analogy fails to provide answers to difficult interpretative
questions. Brown & Williamson, however, does not indicate whether a
U.S. court would discard or interpret a treaty provision quite as force-
fully as the Chancery Division did in Exxon.
The decision of the Court of Claims in Great- West Life Assurance
Co. v. United States162 indicates that at least that court will do so.
Great-West Life Assurance Company, a large Canadian insurer, did a
significant amount of business in the United States. Under the insur-
ance laws of various states, Great-West was obliged to maintain within
each state certain reserves in the form of trusteed accounts. A signifi-
cant portion of Great-West's reserves constituted debts owed to Great-
West by other Canadian entities, including the Government of Can-
ada. In its tax returns, Great-West initially conceded that the interest
received from these Canadian obligors on their debts was income effec-
tively connected with its United States business and therefore subject
to U.S. taxation. However, Great-West petitioned for a refund after
reviewing Article XII of the 1942 United States-Canada Conven-
tion, 163 which prohibited taxation of interest or dividends paid by one
Canadian entity to another. 164
Great-West claimed that Article XII was literally applicable, and
the United States apparently conceded this point. The United States
162. 678 F.2d 180 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
163. 1942 United States-Canada Convention, supra note 69.
164. 678 F.2d at 181-82. Article XII(1) provides,
Dividends and interest paid by a corporation organized under the laws of Canada
to a recipient, other than a citizen or resident of the United States of America or a
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argued, however, that the treaty should not be applied literally in this
case. The United States contended that the purpose of Article XII
was to waive U.S. source rules and the right to tax only if interest or
dividends are paid to Canadians who lacked significant contacts with
the United States.165 The United States asserted that Article XII did
not apply to Great-West, because it was "present" in the United States
and because the income was earned in the United States. Great-West
did not deny that Article XII operated to alter United States source
rules, but it contended that the expansive language of Article XII
should be applied to its situation.166
The Court of Claims rejected the taxpayer's argument, even
though a narrow interpretation of Article XII would mean that the
Article was not perfectly reciprocal.' 67 The court ruled that Great-
West's income on reserves held in the United States was taxable in the
United States.' 68
Great- West is the most conventional treaty interpretation case yet
encountered in this Article. Article XII seems to speak in broad
terms, but the context and contemporaneous documents 69 indicate a
more limited meaning. The decision in Great-West employs both
loose, intention-focused contractual interpretation and rigid statutory
interpretation. 70
The issue that Great-West leaves open is how a treaty's provisions
are to be interpreted in the absence of guidance from contemporane-
ous sources, particularly when non-reciprocity may result from a par-
corporation organized under the laws of the United States of America, shall be
exempt from all income taxes imposed by the United States of America.
1942 United States-Canada Convention, supra note 69, amended by Supplemental Conven-
tion, June 12, 1950, art. l(g), 2 U.S.T. 2235, 2238, T.I.A.S. No. 2347, at 5.
165. See 678 F.2d at 185. The United States cited the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations Report on the original treaty. See id.
166. Id.
167. Article XII is divided into two parts. Part I refers to dividends and interest paid by
a Canadian corporation to a "recipient, other than a citizen or resident of the United States
.. . or a [United States] corporation." 1942 United States-Canada Convention, supra note
69, amended by Supplemental Convention, June 12, 1950,. art.l(g), 2 U.S.T. 2235, 2338,
T.I.A.S. No. 2347, at 5. Part II refers to similar payments by a United States corporation
"whose business is not managed and controlled in Canada" to comparable non-Canadian
recipients. Id. at 2 U.S.T. 2238-39, T.I.A.S. No. 2347, at 6. The two halves of Article XII,
by their own terms, were not perfectly reciprocal. But the interpretation of the United
States, accepted by the court, further compounded this non-reciprocity by defining the sim-
ilar terms "a corporation organized under the laws of Canada" and "a corporation organ-
ized under the laws of the United States" to mean different things. Id. at 2 U.S.T. 2238-39,
T.I.A.S. No. 2347, at 5-6.
168. The court relied on the transmittal letter signed by the Secretary of State at the
time of treaty negotiation, subsequent related legal developments, and the interpretation
placed on Article XII by the Treasury since the implementation of the treaty. 678 F.2d at
186-89.
169. See supra note 168.
170. See 678 F.2d at 183, 188-89.
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ticular interpretation. The United States Supreme Court had faced
this situation previously. 171 Article XIV of the 1945 United States-
United Kingdom Convention 172 provided that a U.K. resident who
was not engaged in a trade or business in the United States would not
be subject to U.S. tax on capital gains. This article was included in the
treaty because at that time the United Kingdom did not tax capital
gains. In Maximov v. United States,173 the trustee of a United States
trust with British beneficiaries contested the imposition of capital
gains tax on undistributed income of the trust.
The treaty did not specifically accord or deny the exemption of
Article XIV to a United States trust with British beneficiaries. The
treaty did not even explicitly make reference to trusts. The trustee
argued that Article XIV should be extended to his case because the
trust's beneficiaries were as deserving of the treaty's exemption as were
the direct recipients of capital gains. The Supreme Court rejected the
notion that treaties secure "invariable or inflexible equality":1 74
It appears from the relevant materials instructive as to the intent of the parties
to the Convention that the general purpose of the treaty was not to assure
complete and strict equality of tax treatment-a virtually impossible task in
light of the different tax structures of the two nations-but rather, as appears
from the preamble to the Convention itself, to facilitate commercial exchange
through elimination of double taxation resulting from both countries levying
on the same transaction or profit; an additional purpose was the prevention of
fiscal evasion.
175
The Supreme Court concluded that Article XIV did not exempt the
trust's capital gains from U.S. taxation. However, the Court implied
that if the gains had been distributed or if the trust were a grantor
trust, the exemption would have applied. 76 These two implications
are significant because they indicate that in rejecting rigid reciprocity
the Supreme Court was not interpreting Article XIV mechanically.
Rather, the Court indicated that if dividends, technically received by a
trust, are distributed currently to a British beneficiary or if that benefi-
ciary is deemed to be the owner of the trust property under the grantor
trust rules, then the Court would apply the Article XIV exemption.
In three of the four cases discussed, Maximov, Great-West, and
Brown & Williamson, the courts proceeded from the notion that tax
treaties are not necessarily premised on reciprocity or equality. In
Exxon, however, the Chancery relied on the notion of reciprocity in
formulating an interpretation that "[did] violence to the language of
171. See Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49 (1963).
172. 1945 United States-United Kingdom Convention, supra note 145, at art. XIV.
173. 373 U.S. 49 (1963). For a more comprehensive discussion of the facts of this case,
see Maximov v. United States, 299 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1962) affd, 373 U.S. 49 (1963).
174. 373 U.S. at 55.
175. Id. at 54 (footnote omitted).
176. See id. at 55 n.3.
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the Convention."1 77 The four cases can be explained more simply and
consistently. In each case, the court's result follows closely the result
that would be reached under the non-treaty tax law of the source
country. 178 The United Kingdom normally would expect to tax divi-
dends paid by a resident company, Holdings, to a nonresident com-
pany, Exxon. Brown & Williamson is given the same interest on its
refund that would be payable to a United States citizen or resident if a
retroactive tax reduction occurred. Capital gains earned and retained
by Maximov, the United States trustee, are fully taxed to the trust
without regard to the identity or domicile of its beneficiaries. Finally,
Great-West was engaged in a trade or business in the United States,
and the income from the assets used in that trade or business was
derived in the United States. The United States collected tax on
Great-West's income. The pattern in these cases is to interpret trea-
ties, in the absence of other direction, by importing into the treaty the
applicable rule of the source jurisdiction. This explanation is sup-
ported by the result in two recent United States rulings.
Revenue Ruling 84-21179 involved the following corporate
structure:
x
3% 3% 
94%
I I
99% 99%
liz
For the year in question, X distAbuted dividends to its three share-
holders, FX, FY, and FZ. Under the 1967 United States-France
177. Inland Revenue Comm'rs v. Exxon Corp., [1982] 1 W.L.R. 999, 1004 (Ch.).
178. There are three possible applicable source country rules. The first is the source
country rule that is applicable to similarly situated nontreaty aliens. The second is the rule
that is applicable to residents (or citizens in the case of the United States) engaging in the
same transaction. The third is a special treaty rule that gives treatment more favorable
than that received by nontreaty aliens but not as favorable as, or at least different from,
treatment received by domiciliary taxpayers.
The first rule is never sought in the case of a treaty national, because the taxpayer can
obtain that result even in the absence of a treaty. The second rule is the normal goal and
the normal result in most cases. An argument could be constructed for the third possibil-
ity, but such a specific divergence from the second rule would seem to require specific
treaty authorization. Most treaties do not provide such authorization. The Great-West
case is one of the few examples in which an argument for the third type of applicable source
rule could be made.
179. 1984-1 C.B. 307.
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Income Tax Convention, 180 tax must be withheld from dividends at a
rate of fifteen percent unless the recipient is a corporation that owns at
least ten percent of the distributing corporation, in which case only
five precent is to be withheld.181 The question presented in the ruling
was whether X only had to withhold five percent from the dividends to
FX and FY on the theory that FZ "owned" directly and indirectly at
least ten percent of X. The treaty used the unadorned verb "owns"
without the adverbs "directly or indirectly." The Ruling concluded
that, because the word "own" in the Internal Revenue Code connotes
direct ownership unless it is explicitly modified by an attribution pro-
vision, the word would have the same connotation in a treaty. 182
Therefore, X would have to withhold at the fifteen percent rate on
dividends to FX and FY. 183
Revenue Ruling 84-17184 interprets the 1974 United States-
Poland Convention. 185 This Ruling supports the general notion that
the interpretation of a treaty reflects underlying domestic revenue law.
The Ruling shows, however, that there are certain limits to this princi-
ple. As was discussed above, 186 the 1966 Act replaced the "force of
attraction" concept with the "effectively connected" principle. How-
ever, the force of attraction concept was partially retained. If a non-
resident alien or foreign corporation has effectively connected business
income, then all business income, whether actually attributable to the
business giving rise to the effectively connected status or not, is
deemed to be effectively connected.1 87 Some tax treaties, including the
Polish Convention, reject this limited force of attraction rule. 188
Instead, they provide that the existence of a permanent establishment
only results in regular taxation of the income attributable to that per-
manent establishment. 189 Business income from other lines of business
of the same foreign entity, unrelated to the permanent establishment,
180. Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Property, July 28, 1967, United
States-France, 19 U.S.T. 5280, T.I.A.S. No. 6518.
181. Id. at art. 9(2).
182. 1984-1 C.B. at 308.
183. Id.
184. 1984-1 C.B. 308. This Ruling was preceded by a similar Ruling under the 1951
United States-Switzerland Convention, supra note 77. Rev. Rul. 79-56, 1979-1 C.B. 459.
In the prior Ruling, the Service held that I.R.C. § 894(b) nullifies the treaty's incorporation
of the existing domestic force of attraction rule in connection with the receipt of a non-
attributable dividend by a Swiss corporation that had a permanent establishment in the
United States.
185. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Oct. 8, 1974, United States-
Poland, 28 U.S.T. 891, T.I.A.S. No. 8486 [hereinafter cited as 1974 United States-Poland
Convention].
186. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
187. I.R.C. § 864(c)(3) (1982).
188. See 1974 United States-Poland Convention, supra note 185, at art. 8.
189. See id.
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are not taxable in the source country. 190
In Revenue Ruling 84-17, the Polish entity conducted three differ-
ent business activities in the United States. Business activity "a" was a
permanent establishment. The taxpayer also derived U.S. source
income from business activity "b," which had no permanent establish-
ment. In addition, the taxpayer had a U.S. source loss from business
activity "c," also not conducted through a permanent establishment.
The taxpayer wished to rely on the treaty for the non-taxation of the
income of activity "b," but it also wished to offset the gain from activ-
ity "a" with the loss from activity "c."
In the absence of a treaty, I.R.C. sections 864 and 882191 would
require that the income and losses of all three activities be added
together. Article 5(2)(a) of the treaty192 permits a taxpayer in this
situation to elect full aggregation as provided under the Code. Neither
the Code nor the treaty permitted election of I.R.C. section 882 aggre-
gation without the inclusion of the income of activity "b." Therefore,
the Ruling rejected the taxpayer's proposal. The taxpayer had to
choose between fully disaggregated treatment, as provided by the
treaty, and full aggregation, as provided by the Code.
Revenue Ruling 84-17 is reconcilable with the notion that the reg-
ular laws of the source country will usually control treaty interpreta-
tion in situations in which the treaty is indeterminate. Thus, the
Ruling rejected the taxpayer's claim, which was inconsistent with the
laws of the source country. The taxpayer wanted partial treaty treat-
ment and partial non-treaty domestic law treatment without any basis
in the treaty or the domestic law for this mixing of results. This Rul-
ing shows that there are limits to the extent to which domestic law
may be read into a treaty. Here, the taxpayer was prohibited from
selecting, on the basis of which result favors him, partial treatment
under domestic law and residual treatment under the treaty.
Although a conclusion that ambiguous treaty language is nor-
mally resolved in favor of the application of the source country's
income tax laws is hardly startling, 193 it is interesting that this princi-
190. See id.
191. I.R.C. §§ 864, 882 (West 1982 & Supp. 1985).
192. See 1974 United States-Poland Convention, supra note 185, at art. 5(2)(a).
193. An occasional exception occurs in administrative proceedings in which the revenue
authorities interpret treaties contrary to the domestic law of the source country in situa-
tions in which an interpretation that is consistent with domestic law would reduce revenue.
Thus, in Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8239019, supra note 2, the Service refused to read into the indirect
credit of Article 23(1) of the 1975 United States-United Kingdom Convention, supra note
2, the sixty-day throwback rule of I.R.C. § 902(c)(1) (1982). In addition, in Brown &
Williamson Ltd. v. United States, 688 F.2d 747 (Ct. Cl. 1982), discussed supra notes 151-61
and accompanying text, the revenue authorities of the United States resisted an interpreta-
tion that would require interest on refunds even though such an interpretation was consis-
tent with U.S. domestic law.
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ple is not usually articulated. Instead, judicial and administrative
opinions speak in terms of reciprocity, equality, contractual versus
statutory interpretation, and liberal 194 versus narrow construction. As
is true of any principle of interpretation, however, source rule domi-
nance is not applied in every situation.
The decision of the Trial Division of the Federal Court of Canada
in Bank of Nova Scotia v. The Queen195 demonstrates this. The Bank
of Nova Scotia owed income tax to the United Kingdom for the year
ending October 31, 1972. The tax was not paid until it became due on
January 1, 1974. The Bank was an accrual method taxpayer. Under
United Kingdom law, it was required to set aside prior to the tax pay-
ment due date an amount equal to the taxes owed. The Bank set the
money aside in pounds sterling. At the time the money was set aside
in October, 1972, it was worth Canadian $452,794. However, because
of a change in the exchange rate, the same amount of pounds sterling
was worth only Canadian $412,514 on the date on which payment was
actually made. Not surprisingly, the Bank wished to claim the higher
amount as a foreign tax credit paid under Canadian law and the 1966
Canada-United Kingdom Agreement. 196
The Income Tax Act of Canada stated that a foreign tax credit is
determined by reference to the tax "paid" by a taxpayer to a foreign
country. 197 This provision seems to indicate the date of payment, in
this case the lower amount, as the proper date for selecting an
This "exception" illustrates that the positions of the revenue authorities on treaty inter-
pretation are an unsound basis on which to construct a theory of interpreting tax treaties.
This also demonstrates, contrary to David Rosenbloom's implication, that although treaties
should be interpreted similarly by the courts and revenue officials, the most reliable inter-
pretations are likely to come from disinterested tribunals. Cf Rosenbloom, supra note 1, at
544.
194. Although "liberal construction" is a recurring "standard" for treaty interpretation,
it is rarely made clear who or what is to be the object of a "liberal" interpretation. In
Saunders v. Minister of Nat'l Revenue, 11 Can. Tax App. Bd. 399 (Can. T.A.B. 1954), an
often-cited case, the Canadian Tax Appeal Board provided one answer:
The accepted principle appears to be that a taxing Act must be construed against
either the Crown or the person sought to be charged, with perfect strictness-so
far as the intention of Parliament is discoverable. Where a tax convention is
involved, however, the situation is different and a liberal interpretation is usual, in
the interests of the comity of nations. Tax conventions are negotiated primarily to
remedy a subject's tax position by the avoidance of double taxation rather than to
make it more burdensome.
Id at 402. The Board concluded that the "retired pay" of a retired U.S. Naval Officer
living in Canada was not a pension, but was akin to regular pay and, therefore, was taxable
only in the United States. The Board's formulation of the purpose of a tax treaty is similar
to that employed by the Tax Court in Burghardt. See supra notes 111-12 and accompany-
ing text.
195. 1980 Can. Tax Cases 57 (Fed. Ct. Can. Tr. Div. 1979).
196. Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Dec. 12, 1966, Canada-United
Kingdom, 1967 Can. T.S. No. 7, 869 U.N.T.S. 23.
197. Act of Dec. 23, 1971, ch. 63, pt. I, § 126(2)(a), 1970-1972 Can. Stat. 1311, 1640,
amended by Act of Apr. 18, 1973, ch. 14, § 39(2), 1973-1974 Can. Stat. 121, 189.
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exchange rate. On the other hand, Article 21 of the Agreement guar-
antees a Canadian credit for any United Kingdom tax "payable."
Article 21 suggests that the credit should be computed using the date
on which the obligation to pay the tax accrued, which would lead to
the larger credit.
The Trial Division judge postulated that the "purpose of foreign
tax agreements generally is to avoid double taxation."' 98 He could
find no risk of double taxation upon either theory of when the credit
should be calculated. On the other hand, because the taxpayer was
using the accrual method, in part as a result of requirements of Cana-
dian banking law, it seemed appropriate to permit it to value its credit
in Canadian dollars as of the time of the accrual of the obligation.
Ultimately, these two conclusions led the court to find for the
taxpayer without appearing to rest its decision on the treaty's use of
the word "payable" or the Canadian Income Tax Act's use of the
word "paid." Moreover, the court's conclusion appears to be contrary
to the use of the word "paid" in the Income Tax Act. Thus, it would
seem to be an unusual case in which ambiguity in a treaty was resolved
in a manner that was contrary to the source country rule.
In sum, the cases indicate that Canadian, British, and U.S. judges
find in treaty ambiguity a basis for applying the rules that are applica-
ble to nontreaty nationals. In most cases, these are also the rules
applicable to domestic taxpayers, because business income is taxed in
the hands of nonresident aliens and foreign corporations as though it
were domestic income of a domestic taxpayer. 199 The conclusion of
this Article explains that this theory, which is obvious in the case of
treaty ambiguity, can also explain the results in cases of arguable
inconsistency with a treaty.
VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The reader of this article has traversed difficult terrain. The cases
are complex, and the language of the statutes and treaties is frequently
vague, occasionally subtle, and usually not easy to interpret. The
temptation is to say that the cases show only the hopeless indetermi-
nacy of language and the willingness of taxpayers and revenue-maxi-
mizing bureaucrats to contest murky questions.
At least one proposition is clear. The legislature is supreme; it
may nullify treaties at any time. The United States took such a step
with FIRPTA and again with stapled entities. However, occasional
198. 1980 Can. Tax Cases at 63.
199. See supra note 178.
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exercises of supremacy do not establish a norm of desirable behavior.
Because treaties are primarily agreements, it is hard to imagine why
they should be abrogable without renegotiation or compliance with
their termination provisions, which usually include notice and one
year's wait. 2°°
The cases discussed above were separated into those that arose
after a change in the underlying revenue law and those that involved
attempts to apply the underlying revenue law to ambiguous treaty lan-
guage. The former cases address the question of whether a treaty pro-
vision has been knowingly curtailed. In Melford, the Supreme Court
of Canada found no evidence of an intention to curtail the "special"
treatment of interest in the 1956 Canada-West Germany Conven-
tion.201 This lack of intention, coupled with the language of the
enabling statute, led the Court to freeze the meaning of the word
"interest" in the treaty at its 1956 meaning. By contrast, in Burg-
hardt, the Tax Court of the United States read the words "specific
exemption" in the 1955 United States-Italy Estate Tax Convention 20 2
to mean "unified credit." This interpretation of the treaty reflected the
change in domestic tax law that substituted the unified credit for the
earlier specific exemption.
The reasoning of both decisions seems wrong. Burghardt relies
on the notion that treaties are designed to help taxpayers and should
be interpreted remedially and for their benefit. However, treaties are
developed by countries primarily to sort out the interfacing aspects of
their tax systems and to cede jurisdiction from the source nation to the
taxpayer's residence nation when the taxpayer's contacts with the
source nation are minimal. When the law has changed, it seems far-
fetched to twist language to save taxpayer benefits that are based on
inference from treaty language. On the other hand, the result in Burg-
hardt may be justifiable because the 1955 United States-Italy Estate
Tax Convention 20 3 intended to confer an estate tax exemption that
was accorded to U.S. citizens and residents but was not available to
200. Governments are sometimes careful to ensure that a change in domestic law does
not overrule treaty provisions. For example, in 1975, Canada instituted a tax on the branch
operations of foreign enterprises. Act of Mar. 13, 1975, ch. 26, § 123, 1974-1976 Can. Stat.
389, 660. The purpose of the tax is to tax the unincorporated branch of a foreign enterprise
in the same fashion as a separately incorporated Canadian subsidiary that annually repatri-
ates its net income to its foreign owner. See 3A CAN. TAX. REP. (CCH) % 26,901 (1981).
The Department of National Revenue, Taxation, issued Interpretation Bulletin No. IT-277
(Jan. 5, 1976), reprinted in 5 CAN. TAX. REP. (CCH) % 52,281 (1976), which admitted that
the change potentially violated the income tax treaty signed with France. The Bulletin
stated that in the event of a conffict between the new law and any treaty, the treaty would
prevail.
201. 1956 Canada-West Germany Convention, supra note 116.
202. 1955 United States-Italy Estate Tax Convention, supra note 102.
203. Id.
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nonresident aliens not subject to the treaty. The same is not true of
Melford. At the time of the conclusion of the 1956 Canada-West Ger-
many Convention,20 4 there was no intention to confer a particular ben-
efit upon treaty nationals. By the time of the disputed transaction,
even Canadian residents could not have guaranty fees exempted from
treatment as interest. In sum, where no particular benefit was
intended, as in Melford, it seems unjustifiable to prevent expansions
and contractions of the meaning of a treaty term, as long as the
changes are not made discriminatorily. In both cases, the judicial
focus should have been on what the signatories were seeking to accom-
plish and not on whether ambiguous language creates unintended ben-
efits that are to be preserved.
GCM 35472 is the key to explaining these treaty cases. The
Memorandum seems wrong in that it disregards, to the taxpayer's det-
riment, treaty language that recognizes the force of attraction rule.
The Memorandum also, in puzzling fashion, reads into the treaty an
implicit guaranty of a feature of domestic law, namely the nontaxation
of foreign source income to a nonresident alien or foreign corporation,
even if engaged in a trade or business within the United States. The
results of GCM 35472 show a tendency to read current domestic law
into ambiguous treaty language.
Exxon and the other cases that try to relate treaty and statutory
language outside of the stressful environment of legislative change do
not appear to be any more successful at identifying coherent bases for
treaty interpretation. Exxon rejects a plausible reading of the treaty
because it would create a nonreciprocal dividend tax article. Brown &
Williamson rejects reciprocity as the touchstone for treaty interpreta-
tion and, together with Great- West, Maximov, and Revenue Ruling 84-
21, shows that ambiguity is normally resolved not in terms of reciproc-
ity or equality but by applying the source jurisdiction rules that are
applicable to a domestic taxpayer. Bank of Nova Scotia may contra-
dict this approach, but it probably demonstrates that the courts of the
residence nation, when it is the forum state, will read into ambiguous
treaty language the nontreaty law of the forum.20 5
The two major bases for interpretation that the courts have sug-
gested, reciprocity and contractualism, are unhelpful. In Exxon, the
problem was not that the clause in the treaty lacks reciprocity, which
is not invariably present, but that it was worded reciprocally and the
taxpayer's interpretation would have rendered it nonreciprocal. The
204. 1956 Canada-West Germany Convention, supra note 116.
205. Thus, a fundamental rule of the taxpayer's residence nation, such as the require-
ment that banks report their gains using the accrual method, may overwhelm a contrary
rule of the source country, even though the latter rule is arguably covered by a treaty.
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parties to tax treaties know how to word provisions nonreciprocally.
Thus, the taxpayer's interpretation is suspect.
Another approach to interpretation is to regard treaties as con-
tracts rather than statutes. Some courts seem to think that the con-
tract approach permits them to take greater liberties with treaty
language.20 6 This approach is also flawed. It seems unlikely that the
signatories, who use expert drafting skills in writing domestic revenue
legislation, would fail to use these skills in writing treaties. Further-
more, the impact of this interpretative device is not clear. Statutes as
well as treaties can be ambiguous, and they may be ambiguous for the
same reasons. For example, the signatories might not have contem-
plated the situation that makes the treaty appear to be ambiguous, or
they might have intentionally fuzzed over some specific problem in
order to produce an agreement. Both phenomena characterize the leg-
islative process as well. Finally, even if one concedes that there is a
categorical distinction between interpreting a treaty as a contract and
interpreting it as a statute, the distinction is not particularly useful. If
a transaction is squarely within or outside precise words in a treaty, as
in Exxon, it is not clear why the courts should have any more license
to revise a treaty than they have to revise a statute.20 7
Whether a tax treaty is viewed as a contract or a statute, the pri-
mary technique of treaty interpretation should be to apply general lan-
guage to specific facts in light of the drafters' intentions. Occasionally,
there is evidence of specific intention. Usually there is no such evi-
dence, and ascertaining intention entails recourse to the general inten-
tions of countries in concluding treaties. These intentions are to
achieve bilateral revenue accommodation with the least possible dero-
gation of the source jurisdiction's regular rules and to exchange lim-
ited waivers of source jurisdiction taxation.208 Occasionally, the
206. See, eg., Estate of Burghardt v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 705 (1983) affid mem., 734
F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1984); Inland Revenue Comm'rs v. Exxon Corp., [1982] 1 W.L.R. 999
(Ch.).
207. One possible justification for treating a treaty as a statute rather than as a contract
is that exemptions accorded to nonsignatories, such as taxpayers, might be accorded a
higher degree of protection under the former approach as opposed to the latter, under
which a third party beneficiary claim has to be constructed. This idea obviously affected
the court in Melford. See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text. However, because
courts usually state that a treaty is to be viewed as a contract and not as a statute, this
justification does not explain the preference for the contract approach.
208. In the well-known case of Johansson v. United States, 336 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1964),
Judge Rives carried the source rule preference to an interesting conclusion. He held that
Ingemar Johansson was not a resident of Switzerland for purposes of applying the 1951
United States-Switzerland Convention, supra note 74, because under U.S. law he would not
have been a Swiss resident. The court disregarded the acceptance of Johansson's Swiss
residence by a competent Swiss official because this acceptance was based on Johansson's
assertion of Swiss residence. 336 F.2d at 812. The income in question was U.S. source
boxing income. The court also held that a recently-formed Swiss corporation, used solely
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parties agree to alter a generally applicable domestic rule. But more
often, the courts apply, in the absence of explicit contrary treaty lan-
guage, the non-treaty rule that is applicable within the source jurisdic-
tion to similarly situated taxpayers.
The proposition that in the absence of a contrary showing of the
drafters' intent courts tend to decide ambiguous cases in favor of the
rules of the source jurisdiction explains situations that vague notions,
such as liberal versus strict construction or contractual versus statu-
tory interpretation, fail to explain. This rule is also less misleading
than the theory that treaties should be reciprocal.
The courts' tendency to apply the rules of the source jurisdiction
may indicate that courts favor the rules of the forum jurisdiction and
would prefer to disregard tax treaties. There is, however, a more prin-
cipled reason to resort to the rules of the source jurisdiction. Tax trea-
ties contain limited cessions of taxing jurisdiction and revenue by
source countries in favor of the taxpayer's nation of residence. These
treaties are consistent with the notion of source country dominance
that is present in foreign tax credit regimes. Insofar as these treaties
contain waivers of source jurisdiction taxation, they are still consistent
with the general notion of source country hegemony, because the
waivers are limited to situations in which contact with the source
country is minimal. Thus, because the basic message of tax treaties is
to permit source country taxation, treaties should be interpreted in
cases of ambiguity to favor the source country rule.
There appears to be only one major exception to the foregoing
theory of treaty interpretation. If a treaty knowingly departs from one
source country rule, a court may attempt to preserve the particular
"benefit" thus granted even in the face of considerable statutory
change. This situation arose in Burghardt, in which the 1955 United
States-Italy Estate Tax Convention 0 9 replaced the low estate tax
exemption of domestic law for non-treaty aliens in favor of the larger
exemption accorded to citizens and residents. However, even Burg-
hardt is reconcilable with the larger theory advanced in this Article
because, in preserving the particular benefit secured by the treaty, the
Tax Court did nothing more than apply the source rule applicable to
citizens and residents. Thus, it would appear that such rules are, and
should be, read into ambiguous treaty language even when it disadvan-
tages the treasury of the source nation to do so.
to take advantage of the Convention's exclusion of U.S. source earned income of a Swiss
resident, could be similarly disregarded. Id. at 813.
209. 1955 United States-Italy Estate Tax Convention, supra note 102.
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